Static Analysis for Architecture-Implementation Conformance in Robust Embedded Systems by Kowshik, Sumant J.
c© 2006 by Sumant Jagadish Kowshik. All rights reserved.
STATIC ANALYSIS FOR
ARCHITECTURE-IMPLEMENTATION CONFORMANCE
IN ROBUST EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
BY
SUMANT JAGADISH KOWSHIK
B.Tech., Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, 1999
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006
Urbana, Illinois
Abstract
Embedded systems have proliferated into diverse and complex critical ap-
plications with stringent reliability and timeliness requirements. Guar-
anteeing reliability in the presence of increasing complexity of embedded
systems have necessitated a multitude of architectural designs including
integrated modular architectures and architectural designs for robustness
by minimizing inter-component failure dependencies.
In the software development cycle, the system integration architect oc-
cupies a key position between the domain-specialist, designing the algo-
rithms and the high-level logical design, and the individual software com-
ponent developers. In essence, the system architect refines the logical de-
sign into concrete software components, while facilitating high-level prop-
erties such as timing, dependency management, and fault-tolerance. Ex-
isting tools for the systems architect include architecture description lan-
guages and model-checking tools, which specify and verify the architectural
designs.
However, there is a gap between the architectural principles and the
actual implementations developed by individual software developers. Low-
level software errors, particularly in languages like C and C++, such as
dangling pointer dereferences and array bounds errors, violate architec-
tural properties. Recent research on debugging tools focus on best-effort
approaches to detecting low-level programming errors. However, there is
a need for tools that guarantee that high-level architectural properties are
enforced in the component implementation. Failure to verify these proper-
ties in the actual code have caused two critical disasters in recent years,
the satellite Phobos I and the Ariane V rocket.
The primary contribution of this dissertation is to design a system to an-
alyze individual components and guarantee high-level architectural prop-
erties in the system using static analysis. In particular, we verify two key
properties: (a) memory isolation and (b) safe value propagation paths from
non-core to core components communicating using shared memory. Our so-
lution combines language and library usage restrictions on the C language
with a suite of compiler analyses to statically guarantee these properties.
In doing so, we incur minimal (often zero) run-time overhead and do not re-
iii
quire garbage collection, making our approach very attractive for embedded
systems. We have examined different critical systems and embedded bench-
marks and shown that our language restrictions are expressive enough for
embedded systems while enabling statically guaranteeing high-level archi-
tectural properties. Finally, we show that we can verify other related archi-
tectural properties by extending our static analysis techniques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The proliferation of embedded systems and control systems constitute the
next step in the information technology revolution [46], where a network of
computers interact with the physical world. We are witnessing widespread
deployment of devices at homes, offices and critical infrastructure systems
such as power plants and aircrafts. Evolving from being software running
on small hardware devices, embedded systems are being networked into
hierarchical distributed systems co-ordinating complex and critical appli-
cations. Unlike desktop or server software, the interaction with the physi-
cal world entails that embedded systems guarantee a core subset of critical
requirements, termed safety requirements.
Traditionally, simple embedded systems were designed by a domain ex-
pert, who started with a simple design and computed the set of equations
that model the physical system. For instance, a control system would be de-
signed using three components, sensor, controller, and actuator, to receive
inputs from the physical system, process control outputs, and send the con-
trol outputs to the physical system respectively. Most of the effort at the
design stage is focused on developing controllers that accurately model the
physical system. Upon finalization, this components in the design were di-
rectly translated to individual software components developed by software
developers. In this design process, the system was only as reliable as its
most complex component, the controller.
Achieving reliability in modern embedded systems is, however, an in-
creasingly challenging goal due to growing complexity. The demand for
functionality of embedded systems has led to a rapid increase in the com-
plexity of embedded software. Increasing complexity leads to a higher prob-
ability of programmer errors, errors due to integration such as timing er-
rors, etc. Traditional tools for enforcing reliability of components such as
rigorous testing and manual inspection are intractable. Moreover, a single
fault in a complex system tends to bring down the entire system function-
ality including the critical functionality of the system. As a result, com-
plexity due desirable features such as usability, performance and other
secondary concerns can compromise the primary, critical functionality i.e
system safety. This concept is captured by the upgrade paradox [83] in re-
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dundant systems where an untested software upgrade, when installed, can
potentially bring down the entire system, and yet cannot be tested with-
out installation. Growing complexity necessitates software architectural
designs that partition features among different components, track depen-
dencies between components, and provide security, fault containment and
fault-tolerance.
1.1 System Integration Architecture
The need for architectural design solutions for robustness has led to the
emergence of a system integration architect in the embedded system devel-
opment timeline. The role of the integration architect is to design the non-
functional requirements of a system such as robustness and security. As
noted above, these architectural requirements are increasingly difficult, if
not impossible, to provide in simple and monolithic system designs. In this
dissertation, we focus only on architectural solutions for robustness. Other
non-functional properties such as security are extensions to this work and
are discussed in chapter 4.
Being unable to avoid faults completely, recent work on building reliable
systems has focused on fault-tolerance and fault containment [82, 81, 79,
16, 41]. Internally partitioning functionality into levels depending on their
criticality protects the components providing critical functionality from rel-
atively untested and unreliable software providing non-critical (though de-
sirable) functionality. In laboratory-scale control systems, we observe that
there are typically three levels of functionality: (1) safety features, which
guarantee a core subset of features, (2) performance, and (3) user-interfaces
and bookkeeping. We illustrate the system design to incorporate this fea-
ture separation in section 1.7.
Simplex [82, 81] is an architectural framework that enables safe online
upgrade of controller software. The architecture describes a stability en-
velope based on the Lyapunov stability envelope within the operationally
admissible states of a controlled plant (e.g., an airplane or an inverted pen-
dulum in the lab), which protects the system against algorithmic or value
errors in the upgraded, untested controller, immediately switching back to
a safe well-tested and reliable (though low-performance) controller when
the plant is detected to be outside the stability envelope. In addition to
value errors, Simplex also protects against timing errors and errors de-
tectable at run time such as crashes, stack or heap overflow or divide by
zero. In practice, simplex assumes that the components have memory and
logical system resource sandboxes thus preventing a memory or a logical
system resource corruption of a peer component.
Examining the architectural designs for robustness, a key principle that
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emerges is the following:
Separation Principle: Logical and/or physical separation of core com-
ponents (which implement critical functionality) and non-core components
such that a fault in the non-core subsystem cannot compromise the core
subsystem functionality.
Informally, the separation principle adumbrates that the core subsystem
does not depend on the non-core subsystem, though it can safely use its func-
tionality. The formal definition of the relationships use and depend between
components are described in [34], based on the effect of faults in non-core
components on the core subsystem. Essentially, if any fault in a non-core
component propagates to a core functionality failure, the core component
is said to depend on the non-core component, which violates the separation
principle. The definition has three main implications, the first two of which
are adapted from Rushby [79]:
1. [SP1] Spatial Separation : enforces that a non-core component can-
not alter the private data or code of a core component, nor command
the private devices or actuators of the other components.
2. [SP2] Temporal Separation : ensures that the resources received by
a core component from a shared platform cannot be affected by a non-
core component’s actions. This includes processing, memory, and other
logical system resources such as file descriptors and communication
bandwidth.
3. [SP3] Safe Inter-component Interaction: enforces that any data
received by the core component from a non-core component is (a) re-
ceived along known channels and (b) monitored for safety before being
used by the core component.
Many sub-properties of the separation principle have been previously
specified as an architectural design requirement, particularly in the context
of avionics architectures by Rushby [79], who has described a detailed list
of properties that integrated modular architectures (IMAs) need to satisfy
for high-assurance applications. However, the definition above describes
component isolation from a robustness perspective, which is a contribution
of this dissertation and other related work [34].
In existing state of the art designs, the properties SP1, SP2, and SP3
are supported by architectural design tools and system utilities. Sophisti-
cated architectural design tools such as architecture description languages
(ADL’s) are formal tools which are aided by model-checking and design ver-
ification technology. Significantly, the SAE-AADL (Architecture Analysis
and Design Language) [77] has emerged as a standard for avionics and em-
bedded systems development. Steve Vastal has proposed an error model
annex [77] to AADL, which is a language that specifies and analyzes faults
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and their propagation at the design level. Other tools that aid design and
verification of architectural designs are described in section 1.6. Each of
these tools operate on designs, which are modular abstractions of the soft-
ware. These designs are used as documentation or as models from which
code stubs are generated. The component developers code the actual imple-
mentation of the individual components.
System utilities can also be exploited by the system integration architect
in order to guarantee the three properties above. For instance, SP1 can
be guaranteed through address space protection, if present on a certain
platform, by implementing a core component and a non-core component as
separate processes (tasks). This causes direct memory violations by a non-
core component to result in a segmentation fault-like run-time error, thus
protecting the core component. More recently, powerful paradigms such as
light-weight real-time virtual machines [66, 67] are used to sandbox each
component in a system to a fixed number of system resources.
1.2 Architecture-Implementation Gap
While, architectural designs and the accompanying verification tools have
addressed design verification, these tools do not verify that the actual im-
plementation conforms to the architectural specifications. Implementation
of components are prone to diverse programmer errors, which can violate
the assumptions or the specifications of the architectural design. Broadly,
the implementation errors violate architectural properties in two ways: (a)
By using erroneous programming constructs leading to arbitrary errors and
(b) By violating the architectural specification along some path/s in the
program. Until recently, there had been little effort in either exhaustive
checking the implementation for common errors or to embed semantic in-
formation that is updated with the evolution of the program, which can be
used to verify the conformance of the implementation to the architectural
design specifications. In other words, there is a need for tools which verify
that there is no divergence between the architectural design and the real
system implementation.
The three properties, SP1, SP2, and SP3, comprising the separation
principle described in the previous section, can be violated due to various
implementation-level issues. For instance, SP1 and SP2 assume that core-
components are protected against memory errors in non-core components
as well as system resource errors. In other words, a memory error such as a
C array overflow in a non-core component such as an unreliable controller
may corrupt the memory of a core component such as safe controller, when
there is no address protection between the two components. Even in the
presence of address protection, buffer overflow attacks [3] can be employed
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by the core component to execute illegal system calls from its data area,
which hog system resources or even execute “lethal” system calls such as
kill -9. These violations of the separation principle are basically at the
implementation level and are not captured by architecture design verifica-
tion tools or, in many cases, even system-level utilities.
Architectural design and assumption violation due to implementation
errors have had catastrophic consequences in the past. The Ariane V ex-
plosion [36] was a result of an overflow in the velocity variable when it was
read by a software component that only allocated two bytes to encode the
velocity. Significantly, the component that had this bug provided a non-
critical function, which propagated causing a failure in the core subsystem.
This is a violation of the separation principle, which is a vital architectural
requirement in such expensive and critical software programs. Similarly, in
the Phobos I spacecraft, a keyboard buffer overflowed into the memory of a
critical aircraft control function [19] corrupting a critical controller module.
1.2.1 Software Implementation Errors
Buggy software have been reported by multiple studies [42] to be the pre-
dominant source of unplanned downtime in large scale computing infrastruc-
tures. Fault-avoidance techniques such as system validation and analyti-
cal models [85] have resulted in valuable techniques for building fault-free
software, but have also shown the impracticality of applying these tech-
niques in large software systems. Candea et. al [42] postulate that while
other branches of engineering build and maintain systems subject to laws
of physics, software is only guided by rules laid down by the programmer,
thus resulting in potentially unbounded failures.
Below, we list the means by which implementation errors can compro-
mise the separation principle, hitherto established to be the most important
architectural design for robustness. While this is by no means a compre-
hensive list, it is derived from a survey of errors in three different proto-
type systems (described in section 1.7), the simplex architecture [82], a car
control testbed [46], and TinyOS [52]. Implementation errors in unreliable
software components can compromise critical software functions through
the following means:
1. Memory errors: Most embedded platforms and programming languages
(C,C++) do not offer address or memory protection (through the MMU,
for instance) thus making it possible for an unreliable component to
corrupt the code or data of core components (violating SP1). On plat-
forms that have address protection, memory errors can be used to ex-
ecute arbitrary system calls from the data area, which can potentially
corrupt the core components or starve them of resources (violating
SP1 and SP2).
5
2. Logical system resource errors: An unreliable component can simply
hog system resources such as memory and file descriptors (violating
SP2)
3. The safe propagation of non-core components to the core components
(SP3) could be violated in either of the following two ways:
(a) Missing run-time monitors (e.g. system recoverability checks) for
values propagated from non-core components to core components
along some path in the core component.
(b) Hidden dependencies due to inadvertent shared variables between
non-core and core components, leading to unexpected propaga-
tion of unmonitored non-core values to the core component.
In addition, implementation errors can violate many other architectural
requirements. For instance, controllers which can receive unreliable or po-
tentially delayed feedback from sensors require that all incoming feedback
values are monitored using a state estimator like a Kalman filter [21] (see
chapter B for details) that quantifies the quality of the feedback. Absence
of these filters for some feedback variable in the program can result in the
core component using out-of-date information along some path in the imple-
mentation. Similar violations of security properties such as integrity and
confidentiality [29] due to implementation errors can be constructed.
1.3 Architecture-Implementation
Conformance
The broad goal of this work is to equip the system integration architect
with tools that enable her to verify that the implementation of the system
satisfies the architectural design principles. Thus, we attempt to bridge
the gap between the architecture and the implementation. As a specific
instance of architectural design specifications, we aim to verify that the
components in the system satisfy the separation principle i.e., that no fault
in a non-core component cause a core subsystem failure.
In general, properties SP1, SP2, and SP3 can be verified in the imple-
mentation by using a combination of static and dynamic analyses, system
run-time utilities, and formal methods. In order to determine our approach,
we examine some key properties of embedded programs/systems:
• First, most embedded programmers use weakly typed languages such
as C or C++. This is a result of the performance-sensitivity of these
applications, which makes the fine-grained control offered by C (and
C++) very attractive.
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• Embedded platforms are small and do not have the processing power
or the memory of regular desktop or server platforms. Thus, these
programs have stringent power, memory, and performance require-
ments. Recent work has shown that garbage collection (and by exten-
sion extensive run-time checking) increases power consumption by up
to % [4].
• Embedded platforms often do not offer address space protection and
is unable to prevent tasks from corrupting each other’s data and code
area. This has been coupled with the trend in embedded systems from
a federated architecture to an integrated modular architecture [79],
where a single computer system provides computing resources to sev-
eral functions. The primary motivation for this architectural migra-
tion is the increasing hardware costs of providing individual comput-
ing systems for components in complex control systems such as in
avionics. Traditional designs where software components run on ded-
icated computer systems led to diverse hardware making the certifi-
cation of software components on unique platforms expensive.
• Detecting the existence of erroneous dependencies at run-time is par-
ticularly unattractive for critical embedded systems, for two reasons.
First and foremost, detecting such architectural violations in critical
systems may be “too late”. The system may already be in an unre-
coverable state potentially leading to catastrophic effects. Secondly,
run-time exception handling is generally challenging to code, partic-
ularly in languages like C and C++. Weimer et al [94] found a large
number of errors even in real-world Java [45] programs, where excep-
tion handling is arguably better supported by the language than C
and C++. Moreover, run-time exception handling has a high perfor-
mance penalty.
In addition to the above properties, it is desirable that our techniques
for verifying the implementation are legacy code compatible. Also, any
technique, which requires programmer assistance via annotations or code
rewriting should incur minimal overhead on the programmer. With respect
to annotations, Leveson [68] has demonstrated that programmers have
varying ability in writing functional invariants and often wrongly place
self-checks in their code. Hence, any annotations required of the program-
mer should be very simple, local, and easy-to-use.
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1.4 Static Analysis for
Architecture-Implementation
Conformance
In this work, we demonstrate the utility and the advantages of static analy-
sis in validating that the component implementation satisfy architectural
design properties. In particular, we demonstrate the contribution of static
analysis in validating the properties of the separation principle between
the core and the non-core subsystem. We have developed two analyses:
1. Static analysis for memory safety: Statically guaranteeing that a com-
ponent cannot overwrite any memory that is not allocated for or by it
and that it cannot execute any code from its data area. In addition,
it is enforced statically that each component only invokes trusted sys-
tem call wrappers provided, preventing any system resource errors
(the run-time checks themselves are outside the scope of this work).
2. Static analysis to check value propagation path errors: Statically guar-
antee that any value communicated through shared memory by a non-
core component is monitored to satisfy system reliability (or recover-
ability) conditions before being used by a core component.
Both analyses rely on some support from system utilities, early run-time
checks, formal methods or manual inspection. Specifically, our analysis
to guarantee memory safety guarantees SP1 (spatial separation) with the
aid of a run-time system that detects if the heap or stack space grows be-
yond a certain bound. The second analysis above verifies that all non-core
values are monitored by the core component before being used (safe inter-
component interaction, SP3). The correctness of the monitor itself is not
guaranteed by the analysis and can be assured only by formal reasoning
or manual inspection. In this sense, static analysis alone does not validate
the separation principle, but is a significant component of a larger system
that guarantees the properties. Moreover, static analysis minimizes the
dependence on the run-time system, manual inspection or difficult-to-scale
formal methods. Towards guaranteeing the separation principle, we rely
on a run-time system to validate SP2 (temporal separation), though our
analysis for memory safety contains a coarse-grained check that restricts
the system calls invoked by a component to a safe subset.
Our basic approach involves starting with the C language and imposing
a few semantic restrictions in order to facilitate static checking of the de-
sired properties. The language restrictions reduce and in most cases elimi-
nate the false positives generated due to the imprecision of static analysis.
In our experiments, we verify that these semantic language rules are rea-
sonable to implement a broad class of embedded and control systems. The
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second analysis above also requires the programmer to insert a few annota-
tions regarding semantic information such as the properties of the monitor
in the core component.
Due to the aforementioned properties of embedded systems, compiler-
based static analysis provides four distinct advantages over techniques such
as testing, formal verification and dynamic checks. First, it is done at com-
pile time, thus avoiding any run-time overhead, making it very attractive
for embedded system. Secondly, it can provide guarantees by conserva-
tively analyzing all the paths in the programs for a certain property. This
distinguishes it from testing which is limited by its input set and the cover-
age achieved. Thirdly, it provides early error detection, enabling detecting
many programming errors at compile time rather than during the execu-
tion of a critical system when failures can have a high performance penalty.
Finally, compiler analyses examine the implementation instead of the ar-
chitectural model, thus detecting any hidden dependencies on unreliable
components. This provides guarantees on the implementation rather than
the system design.
Static analysis has its limitations. Being a conservative analysis, false
positives can result in reporting errors where none exist. In these cases,
manual examination is required to actually check if the reported error ex-
ists. In addition complex language constructs such as complex array indices
and arbitrary casting in C reduces the precision of the analysis, necessitat-
ing run-time checking of the properties in these cases. Static analysis is
also ineffective in checking semantic properties that are not expressible by
variables in the code or cannot be annotated on variables in the code. For
dynamically changing properties, static analysis can only be used to verify
that the required run-time checks are appropriately invoked.
1.5 Summary of Contributions and
Limitations
The overall contribution of our work is to demonstrate that static analysis
is an important tool for the system integration architect to verify high-level
architectural properties in the implementation. Specifically, we have devel-
oped and evaluated the following:
1. Control-C, a dialect of C, which is expressive enough for control and
embedded systems and can be analyzed to guarantee memory safety
without run-time software checks or garbage collection.
(a) We developed a novel analysis that ensures that dangling pointer
dereferences are memory safe. In this context, we developed an
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analysis method to determine programs that potentially have in-
creased memory consumption.
(b) Our experiments showed that our analyses provedmemory safety
without run-time software checks or garbage collection for a large
class of control and embedded systems. (This class is even larger
if run-time checks are inserted for bounds-checking certain array
indexing in the program).
2. Safe value propagation:
(a) We have identified multiple implementation errors that can vi-
olate value propagation paths between non-core and core com-
ponents. We statically verify that critical components monitor
values from unreliable components before using them. We de-
tected multiple hidden dependencies in the simplex implementa-
tions for different control systems.
(b) We have developed a simple annotation language that can repre-
sent semantic information regarding run-time monitors and crit-
ical information in the core component.
(c) Our analysis forms the verifiable “last line of defense” against the
effects of many complex, difficult-to-detect errors including data
races and data incompatibilities.
3. A co-design based architecture to make networked control systems tol-
erant to timing errors such as delays and restarts of individual com-
ponents.
Our approach has a few limitations that need to be addressed in fu-
ture work. First, we handle only single-threaded programs. Secondly, our
analysis to support SP2 (temporal isolation) simply involves restricting the
component to invoke a subset of system calls assuming the presence of a
run-time system to regulate system resources granted to the non-core sub-
system. In the future, the requirement imposed on the run-time system
can be reduced with the aid of additional static analyses. Finally, partic-
ularly in detecting the set of values in the core component affected by an
unmonitored, unsafe non-core value, static analyses can result in false pos-
itives along longer paths. In the future, ranking of these results can aid the
manual inspection of the potential erroneous dependencies reported.
1.6 Prior Work on Robust System
Development
Prior work on robust system development has focused on two complemen-
tary approaches – robust system architectures and tools that enforce archi-
10
tectural properties. The respective utility of architectural and tool-based
approaches varies depending on their precision, scalability, and their posi-
tion in the design-develop-test-execute cycle. In particular, formal verifica-
tion has been applied at design time; static analysis and testing at devel-
opment time, and run-time monitoring and dynamic analysis at execution
time.
1.6.1 Architectural Solutions for Robustness
Traditionally, fault tolerance in dependable systems has been achieved through
replication [85]. While replication is very successful technique in hardware
which tend to have random errors errors, it has proved ineffective in soft-
ware, except for race conditions, which are indeed random. Algorithmic er-
rors and other software bugs when replicated produce the same erroneous
values across all the replicas. In addition, as mentioned in the previous
section, the upgrade paradox shows that an upgrade is ineffective when ef-
fected in a minority of the replicas and is vulnerable to bugs in the upgrade
when effected in a majority of the replicas. Finally, redundancy through
n-version programming [7] has proved expensive in practice and studies [7]
have shown that different teams of programmers tend to make similar er-
rors while developing complex systems.
Rushby [79] and ARINC Specification 653 [23] describe a comprehensive
set of requirements for partitioning components in IMA Firstly, Rushby de-
scribes the “alternative gold standard” to be that the behavior and perfor-
mance of software in one partition must be unaffected by the software in
other partitions. ARINC Spec. 653 describes spatial partitioning as the
property that the software in one partition cannot change the software or
private data of another partition or access private actuators and devices.
Enforcing this requirement requires protection against memory errors and
system resource errors that hog resources that have been dedicated to an-
other component. Temporal partitioning ensures that the service received
from shared resources by software in one partition cannot be affected by
the software in another partition. Enforcing this requirement prevents the
errors due to corruption or hogging of shared system resources including
timing issues due to poor scheduling of the CPU. The alternative gold stan-
dard does not sufficiently address the value propagation errors between
components in different partitions due to communication.
Rushby [79] describes two designs for partitioning components: application-
level partitioning on a common operating system and a virtual machine
architecture, which provides separate operating system services for each
partition above a minimal kernel. In highly critical systems like avion-
ics, the virtual machine architecture, which sandboxes resources, devices,
and software components in a single partition thus providing a virtual ma-
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chine for each partition, is an attractive choice. Verifying this architecture
involves formally guaranteeing that each partition is spatially and tempo-
rally separated with respect to all hardware registers, resources, devices,
and address space. The virtual machine architecture is too heavy-weight
for the purposes of general purpose control and other embedded systems.
For general purpose embedded systems, the feature separation between
core and non-core functionality provided by Simplex [82] constitutes the
state of the art in robust architectural design. Fault-tolerant system design
properties such as masking fault-tolerance also rely on separation between
critical and non-critical functionality [5].
In addition, there are several miscellaneous techniques that provide ro-
bustness against value and delays in control systems. Cunha et al [53, 26]
have described the mechanism of using a fail-bounded model as a run-time
monitor to protect against controller value errors due to transient errors.
The monitor verifies that the controller output is within the bounds of sta-
bility, taking recovery measures if a controller may bring down the system.
State estimators like the Kalman filter [21] have been used in control sys-
tems to protect against sensor value errors. Also, there is a wealth of control
theoretic literature as listed in [75], which describe estimation filter tech-
niques for controllers in the presence of communication and sensor delays.
1.6.2 Tools for Robustness
A diverse set of tools have been developed in literature for use at differ-
ent points of the development cycle. Domain experts use modeling tools
such as Matlab and Simulink, which are useful in developing the set of
the equations that govern the physical world. In very simple embedded
systems, this prototype can be used to generate code (or code stubs) itself.
More complex architectures satisfy properties which can be verified using
architecture description languages. Apart from SAE-AADL [77], which was
described earlier, fault tree analysis [24] is an extensively used design tool
used to describe the propagation of faults across components. However,
in most cases fault trees are generated manually by an expert. Leveson
et al [69] have developed an approach to generate fault trees from source
code using a manual technique. The fine-grainedness of the faults and the
manual approach results in very large fault trees in practice. Arora and
Kulkarni [5] have demonstrated the design of masking fault-tolerant sys-
tems, whose architecture they formally analyze. Their analysis is carried
out on an abstraction (albeit, detailed), which is different from the actual
implementation.
Several static analysis tools have been developed to verify global robust-
ness properties. SFI [91], CCured [22], Cyclone [55], and Java [45, 12] have
either prevented or sandboxed memory errors through run-time checking,
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compiler-based static analyses or language mechanisms, or through a com-
bination of these techniques. However, all of them are unsuitable for em-
bedded systems due to their run-time overheads, platform dependence and
porting effort. (This is further discussed in chapter 2). Giotto [51] is a lan-
guage that enables specifying the timing requirements of hard real-time
components, whose schedulability can be verified by the compiler. Thus
timing requirements of unreliable components in the context of the remain-
der of the system can be verified before these components are executed. The
Ada-SPARK system [8] defines a safe subset of the Ada language which sta-
tically prevents memory errors and utilizes annotations to make the data
flow information in a program explicit, thus avoiding implicit value propa-
gation errors for a subset of Ada.
Run-time monitoring [49, 18, 58] verifies that assertions and invariants
in the code hold at execution time. It is useful for consistency properties
and for error handling within a single component at execution time. These
invariants or assertions are most useful in analyzing functional properties.
Testing based techniques to determine failure dependency graphs such as
automatic failure-path inference [15] are useful analytical tools, but do not
provide any guarantees. Moreover, testing an integrated system is less and
less tractable as systems become more complex [86].
1.7 Research-Scale Control Systems
In order to experimentally evaluate our techniques for robustness, we use
three laboratory scale projects that are complex enough to demonstrate our
ideas. Independent sources from the industries such as Lockheed Martin
have observed that these research-scale systems are representative of real
systems in the field. In both the systems described below, a system inte-
gration architect developed a robust architecture, while 1-3 domain experts
and software developers developed the domain-specific equations and the
individual components respectively.
The inverted pendulum shown in figure 1.1 is a classic real-time feed-
back control system which is balanced by adjusting the position of the cart.
The control periodically receives track position and pendulum angle as feed-
back from the sensor. The Simplex architecture is used in this system to
enable online upgrades of high-performance controllers, while keeping the
pendulum upright even in the presence of bugs or malicious attacks in an
unreliable controller.
The traffic control testbed was developed in the IT Convergence Lab
at CSL, UIUC, as a research prototype to study networked control sys-
tems [46]. The testbed, shown in figure 1.2, consists of autonomous cars
operating on an indoor track in various traffic scenarios. The trajectory of a
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Figure 1.1: Simplex for the Inverted Pendulum
Figure 1.2: Traffic control testbed
car is determined by its speed and orientation, and control is accomplished
by changing these parameters. Currently, cars have no on-board comput-
ing capability, and are controlled through radio frequency transmitters on
dedicated channels. Control for each car is computed by software executing
on a corresponding laptop. For our purposes, however, this configuration is
equivalent to each car having a dedicated on-board computer.
Cars are tracked by a vision system consisting of two ceiling mounted
cameras. The video stream from each camera is processed by software ex-
ecuting on a corresponding desktop computer. This software scans a video
stream as a sequence of frames, and extracts positions and orientations of
cars in the field of vision. This information is then available as feedback to
control the cars.
1.8 Organization of Chapters
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes
the background work on compiler and run-time techniques to guarantee
memory safety for programs. We also describe previously developed founda-
tional compiler analyses on which we have built our own analyses. It then
goes on to describe Control-C, a dialect of C, which is expressive enough
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for a broad class of embedded and control systems, which enables us to
guarantee memory safety with no run-time overhead. Chapter 3 discusses
the notion of use and depend relationships between communicating com-
ponents and provides an accompanying compiler analysis to enforce that
critical components only use data from unreliable components without de-
pending on it. Chapter 4 synthesizes the techniques in the earlier chapters
in the context of building a robust system. It also describes mechanisms to
extend our techniques to a broader class of applications. We conclude with
chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Spatial Isolation
Programming environments, including programming languages, compilers
and run-time systems, play a vital role in improving the reliability and effi-
ciency of software. A key class of properties provided by these environments
is that of program safety, i.e., prevention of semantic errors such as type
violations or memory access violations will not be allowed to occur unde-
tected. Such safety guarantees provide three benefits. First and foremost,
they enable development of reliable software by detecting and preventing
programming errors at compile time or run time. Second, they ensure bet-
ter isolation between different components or modules of a software system,
which is particularly important for safety-critical software. Finally, static
analysis enables checking many errors at compile time. Early detection of
errors in the development cycle instead of run-time detection is important
for many critical systems with strict performance and energy constraints.
Embedded systems and control systems today avail of practically none
of the benefits offered by modern programming environments. They are of-
ten written in type-unsafe languages like C and C++, which do not prevent
a host of errors including uninitialized variables, dangling pointers, and
buffer overflows. In this chapter we first discuss the importance of memory
safety for embedded system components, define our goals, and finally out-
line our approach and our prior work on which we have built our solution.
Our approach and the comparison with other related work is discussed in
detail in the following chapter (section 2.4).
2.1 Motivation, Definitions, and Goals
Memory errors in buggy components can overwrite and corrupt memory
locations allocated to other components in the system, including critical
components, system memory, and other reliable infrastructure. This prob-
lem is particularly relevant to embedded systems, where components are
not protected by address space boundaries such as process boundaries in
Unix. This has proved to be an important problem in practice as evidenced
by the Phobos I disaster [19], where a keyboard buffer overflow corrupted a
critical aircraft control function. The Simplex architecture [82, 81] protects
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critical components against value, timing and run-time faults in unreliable
components, but does not prevent memory errors. Simplex also uses the
process abstractions to sandbox some components, but such protection may
be unavailable. Moreover, processes do not prevent violation due to mali-
cious memory errors. Thus, the infrastructure is vulnerable to buggy and
malicious codes, which can potentially corrupt critical components.
Another manifestation of memory errors is the execution of illegal sys-
tem calls from the data area of a component, through simulated buffer over-
flows and other memory errors. Three such attacks (there are many similar
ones) are illustrated in figure 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. The code snippets shown il-
lustrate the mechanisms that can be used as malicious attacks through
memory errors on Linux 2.2.18. In each of the attacks, the killcode array
shown in Fig. 2.1 represents binary code for the StrongARM that executes
the kill(-1, 9) system call, so that the code is hidden in the data area.
Each attack uses a different mechanism to jump to the array address in or-
der to execute this code. Figure 2.2 uses a cast from a character string to a
function pointer is used to jump to the code in the killcode array. Fig. 2.3
demonstrates the use of uninitialized pointers to compromise the system.
Invocation of the function init initializes the stack with values such that
when func is invoked, the local pointer variable p in func contains the ad-
dress of the return address of func on the stack. Dereferencing p modifies
the return address. This in turn, results in the the skipping of the instruc-
tion decrementing ’i’ after the return, leading to the overflow of mainbuf.
This in turn overwrites the return address of controlFunction with the
address of killcode.
char killcode[] =
"\x55\x89\xe5\x89\xe5\xb9\x09\x00\x00
\x00\xbb\xff\xff\xff\xff\xb8\x25\x00
\x00\x00\xcd\x80\x89\xd3\xc3\x90";
Figure 2.1: Source for the killcode array
void controlFunction(float a, float b) {
void (*func)();
func = (void (*)) &killcode[0];
func(); // jump to &killcode[0]
...
}
Figure 2.2: Illegal cast
Motivated by the above effects of memory errors, we define memory
safety as follows:
A software entity (a module, thread or complete program) is memory safe
if (a) it never references a memory location outside the address space allo-
cated by or for that entity, and (b) it never executes instructions outside the
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void func() {
int *p; /* contains address of return
address stack slot */
(*p) += 22; /* modifies return address */
}
void init() {
long i;
i = &i - 2; /* Store address of return
} * address stack slot */
void controlFunction(float a, float b) {
int mainbuf[3], i = 4;
init(); /* Stack initialized */
func(); /* returns 3 lines down */
if ((int)a % 2) {
i -= 3; /* never executed */
mainbuf[i] = killcode; /* force return to
&killcode[0] */
}
}
Figure 2.3: Illegal return via an uninitialized variable
code area created by the compiler and linker within the address space.
This definition of memory safety incorporates spatial separation (SP1)
from chapter 1. In addition, it also guarantees that there are no hidden
system calls that can be executed from its data area, which, in turn, enables
verification that the set of system calls belong to a safe permitted subset.
This property is a prerequisite to guaranteeing temporal isolation (SP2)
and safe inter-component interaction (SP3).
Our goal in this work is to enforce memory safety for embedded sys-
tems written in languages like C and C++ with no run-time software checks
or garbage collection. In particular, we define a subset of the C language,
which is restrictive enough to guarantee memory safety through static analy-
sis alone, but is expressive enough to program a broad class of embedded
and control systems. We ensure that there are not syntactic changes and
only semantic restrictions to avoid any porting effort.
2.2 Memory Safety: The SAFECode
Approach
Our approach to guarantee memory safety is a part of the SAFECode project
(see
http://safecode.cs.uiuc.edu) in collaboration with Dinakar Dhurjati
at UIUC. In particular, the contributions of this chapter and Dhurjati’s dis-
sertation [30] provide a complete solution to the memory safety problem.
Dhurjati’s contributions will be distinctly highlighted at the appropriate
points.
The SAFECode technique consists of identifying all causes of violation
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of memory safety in type-unsafe languages such as C and consequently
performing a series of compiler analyses that enforce that these violations
are detected and prevented or that they do not cause memory safety vio-
lations. Significantly, we apply only minor semantic restrictions on C pro-
grams, while still obtaining all the benefits of safe languages, without using
garbage collection or run-time software checks. The minimum guarantee
provided is memory safety as defined in the previous section. In addition
we provide significant error detection, similar to strongly type safe lan-
guages, with one exception: we allow dereferencing of dangling pointers
but enforce that such dereferences are, in fact, safe. The latter clause vi-
olates the technical definition of strong type safety. Furthermore, we rely
on some assumptions on the hardware-supported address space protection
(which are reasonably commonplace).
2.3 Prior Work
Our compiler analyses for memory safety take advantage of two existing
analyses, the data structure analysis [62] and automatic pool allocation
transformation [64], in addition to a previous established key principle for
memory safety, the type homogeneity principle, used to guarantee safety
of dangling pointer dereferences. The two analyses and the principle are
described in this section.
2.3.1 Data Structure Analysis
Data Structure Analysis (DSA) is a pointer analysis algorithm that is care-
fully designed to identify disjoint instances of entire pointer-based data
structures and their lifetimes, while remaining fast and scalable enough
for large, realistic programs. DSA computes a points-to graph representa-
tion we call a Data Structure Graph (DS Graph). DS graphs provide all of
the information used in the rest of this work (including Automatic Pool Allo-
cation). We describe DS graphs first and then briefly discuss the properties
of DSA needed to achieve our goals while keeping it efficient and scalable.
A DS Graph captures compile-time information about the memory ob-
jects created by a program and the pointer relationships between them. A
separate DS graph is computed for each function in a program, except that
all functions within a strongly connected component of the call graph share
a single, common points-to graph (we do not try to be context-sensitive
within such recursive regions). Different nodes within the same graph
represent distinct memory objects. Formally, a DS Graph is a directed
multi-graph, where the nodes and edges are defined as follows:
DS Node : A DS node is a 5-tuple {τ, F,M,A,G}. τ is some program-
defined type, or ⊥ representing an unknown type. In the analysis,
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struct list { list *Next; int *Data; };
list* createnode(int *Data) {
list *New = malloc(sizeof(list));
New->Data = Data;
return New;
}
void splitclone(list *L, list **R1, list **R2) {
if (L == 0) { *R1 = *R2 = 0; return; }
if (some_predicate(L->Data)) {
*R1 = createnode(L->Data);
splitclone(L->Next, &(*R1)->Next, R2);
} else {
*R2 = createnode(L->Data);
splitclone(L->Next, R1, &(*R2)->Next);
}}
(a) Fragment of C program manipulating linked
lists
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(b) DS Graphs for createnode() (left) and splitclone().
Figure 2.4: Example illustrating Data Structure Graphs
⊥ is treated like an unknown-size array of bytes. F is an array of
fields, one for each possible field of the type τ . Scalar or array types
have a single field. M is a set of memory classes, written as a subset
of {H,S,G,U}, indicating Heap, Stack, Global and Unknown memory
objects respectively. A U node is assigned type ⊥. Finally, if G ∈ M ,
thenG is a non-empty set of global variables and functions included in
the objects for this node; otherwise, G is empty. Finally, A is a boolean
that is true if the node includes an Array object.
DS Edge : A DS edge is a 4-tuple: {s, fs, t, ft}, where s and t are DS nodes,
and fs and ft are fields of s and t respectively. Thus, the graph pro-
vides a field-sensitive representation of points-to information. A field
of a node may have no outgoing DS edge only if the field is known not
to contain a pointer type, e.g., it is a function, floating point, or small
integer type, or ifM = {U}.
Figure 2.3.1(b) shows the DS graph computed for function splitclone
of an example program, computed by our compiler. Note that each node of
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type list has two fields. The cycles indicate recursive data structures.
The DSA algorithm, which computes DS graphs, is described in [62].
DSA is “fully context-sensitive” in the sense that it names heap objects by
entire acyclic call paths (which we refer to as “full heap cloning”), and it
is field-sensitive, i.e., it distinguishes distinct pointer fields within a struc-
ture. Being fully context-sensitive is important because it allows the analy-
sis to distinguish heap objects that may be created, processed, and de-
stroyed by calling common functions. This enables Automatic Pool Allo-
cation (which is based on DS graphs, as described below) to put distinct
instances of the same logical data structure into distinct pools in many
cases. In the DS graph for splitclone in Figure 2.3.1, R1 and R2 point to
distinct nodes, indicating that the analysis has proved the two linked lists
are completely disjoint. This allows pool allocation to put these two lists in
distinct pools, even though they are created in an interleaved fashion and
by calling the same function.
To achieve speed and scalability, DSA is flow-insensitive and it uses a
unification-style analysis, i.e., a pointer field at a node has exactly one out-
going DS edge so that all pointer target objects of the pointer are merged
into a single graph node. We argue in [62] that the combination of full heap
cloning with unification is scalable to very large programs in practice. DSA
correctly analyzes non-type-safe programs and incomplete programs, and
infers the call graph incrementally as part of the analysis using a new, non-
iterative technique. The first two properties are essential for real-world
use.
DSA actually computes multiple DS graphs for each function. The “com-
plete bottom-up” DS graph for a function incorporates the effects of all func-
tions reachable from the current function (i.e., immediate callees and their
callees and so on), including functions called via function pointers [64]. The
final, “top-down” DS graph of a function incorporates the effects of both the
callers as well as the callees of a function, so that it captures the full set
of memory objects and aliasing relationships from all possible call-sites (as
well as those due to side effects of callee functions).
We have evaluated DSA experimentally for over 35 C programs, and
found that it is both extremely efficient and scales well across a large range
of program sizes [62]. DSA requires about 2-8 seconds and less than 16MB
of memory for several C programs ranging in size from 60K to 130K lines
of code. Empirically, it also scales almost linearly in analysis time for 35
benchmarks spanning 4 orders-of-magnitude of code size. No previous al-
gorithm we know of has demonstrated both speed and scalability with full
heap cloning. DSA is compared with previous pointer analyses in more
detail in [62].
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2.3.2 Automatic Pool Allocation
Given an ordinary imperative program that uses explicit allocation (e.g.,
malloc) and deallocation (e.g., free), the Automatic Pool Allocation trans-
formation [64] rewrites the program to segregate heap objects into multi-
ple pools, by performing allocation and deallocation operations from those
pools. The transformation attempts to use separate pools of memory for
each logical data structure instance (e.g., a particular linked list or a graph)
that is not exposed to unknown external functions. This differs from other
automatic region inference algorithms that infer regions primarily for per-
forming automatic memory management [88, 20], which do not consider
data structure relationships in choosing how to partition objects into re-
gions.
We use a pool allocation library with five simple operations:
(a) poolinit(Pool** PP, unsigned size) allocates and initializes
a new pool descriptor for objects of the specified size;
(b) pooldestroy(Pool* PP) clears the pool descriptor and releases the
remaining memory in the pool back to the system heap;
(c) poolalloc (Pool* PP, unsigned nbytes) allocate a single ob-
ject or an array of objects in the pool, depending on nbytes and the
size of the objects in the pool and
(d) poolfree (Pool* PP, T* ptr) deallocates an object within the
pool by marking its memory as available for reallocation by poolalloc.
A pool is created before the first allocation for its data structure instance
and destroyed at a point where there are no accessible references to data
in the pool. The pool library internally uses ordinary malloc and free
to obtain memory from the system heap and return it when part of a pool
becomes unused or the pool is destroyed.
To illustrate the pool allocation transformation we use the example in
Figure 2.5. In this example, function f calls g, which first creates a linked
list of 10 nodes, initializes them, and then calls h to do some computation.
g then frees all of the nodes except the head and then returns.
The pool allocation transformation operates as follows:
1. Identify pools within each data structure: We traverse the complete
bottom-up Data Structure Graph (DSG) of each function to identify
heap nodes. Each heap node in this DSG corresponds to objects of a
single data type, allocated within the current function or one of its
callees. Objects corresponding to this node are allocated in a single
pool.
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f() {
...
g(p);
// p->next is dangling
p->next->val = ... ;
}
g(struct s *p) {
create_10_Node_List(p);
initialize(p);
h(p);
free_all_but_head(p);
}
h(struct s *p) {
for (j=0; j < 100000; j++) {
tmp = (struct s*) malloc(sizeof(struct s));
insert_tmp_to_list(p,tmp);
q = remove_least_useful_member(p);
free(q);
}
}
Figure 2.5: Pointer safety and pool allocation example
2. Identify where to create/destroy pools: For each procedure, the DSG
can be used to identify those DS nodes that are not accessible after
the procedure returns (i.e., nodes that are not reachable from globals,
formal arguments and return value). For each such node, we insert
calls to create and destroy the corresponding pools of memory at the
entry and exit of the procedure.1 In our running example, the linked
list does not escape from the procedure f() to its callers and so we
create and destroy the pool for the list in procedure f(), as shown in
Figure 2.6.
3. Transform (de)allocation operations and function interfaces: We trans-
form all malloc and free calls in the original program to use the
pool allocation versions, as illustrated in function h(). For any func-
tion containing such operations on a pool created outside the func-
tion, we add extra arguments to pass the appropriate pool pointers
into the function (and do the same for possible callers of such func-
tions, and their callers and so on). The transformation uses the call
graph constructed by DSA for all interprocedural steps, and correctly
handles programs with function pointers and recursion. The changes
are illustrated by the functions g() and h() and their invocations in
Figure 2.6.
1Our pools do not require nested lifetimes. We could move poolinit later in the function
and move the pooldestroy earlier or into a callee using additional flow analysis, but we do
not do so currently.
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f() {
Pool *PP;
poolinit(PP, sizeof(struct s));
...
g(p, PP);
// p->next is dangling
p->next->val = ... ;
pooldestroy(PP);
}
g(struct s *p, Pool *PP) {
create_10_Node_List(p, PP);
initialize(p);
h(p, PP);
free_all_but_head(p, PP);
}
h(struct s *p, Pool *PP ) {
for (j=0; j < 100000; j++) {
tmp = poolalloc(PP);
insert_tmp_to_list(p, tmp);
q = remove_least_useful_member(p);
poolfree(PP, q);
}
}
Figure 2.6: Example after pool allocation transformation
The result of this transformation for type-safe programs is that all heap-
allocated objects are assigned to type-homogeneous pools, nodes in disjoint
data structure instances identified by DSA are assigned to distinct sets of
pools, and individual items are allocated and freed from the individual pools
at the same points that they were before. A pool is destroyed when there
are no more live (i.e., reachable) references to the data in the pool.
Note that the transformation as described so far does not ensure pro-
gram safety. Explicit deallocation via poolfree can return freed memory
to its pool and then back to the system, which can then allocate it to a
different pool. Dangling pointers to the freed memory could allow data of
arbitrary types to be accessed, and could violate memory safety.
2.3.3 Type Homogeneity Principle
The primary challenge in enforcing memory safety without garbage collec-
tion and with explicit deallocation is to detect dangling pointer dereferences
or ensure memory safety in the presence of such dereferences. We adopt the
latter approach through the use of the following principle:
(Type homogeneity principle) If a freed memory block holding a single object
were to be reallocated to another object of the same type and alignment, then
dereferencing dangling pointers to the previous freed object cannot cause a
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type violation.
This principle implies that to guarantee memory safety, we do not need
to prevent dangling pointers or their usage in the source — we only need
to ensure that they cannot be dereferenced in a type unsafe manner. The
principle allows correct programs (i.e., programs with no uses of dangling
pointers) to work correctly without any runtime overhead. Programs with
dangling pointer errors will execute safely but we will not detect such errors
for these programs.
It is important to note that this principle only enables dangling pointers
to dereference memory within the same thread. Also, pools only contain
memory within a single thread and reallocate memory only to the same
thread. Therefore, in the event of a dangling pointer dereference in the
core component, the dangling pointer can only access memory within its
own thread and cannot inadvertently access data in a non-core component.
This is vital to the property verified in the following chapter (chapter 3):
explicit communication between core and non-core components (threads).
One objection to achieving safety via the above principle is that it can
make itmore difficult for programmers to detect dangling pointer errors be-
cause such errors would not produce any type violations. During debugging,
however, the above principle need not be used. In fact, the pool allocation
library and runtime system can use many run-time techniques to assist in
detecting dangling pointer errors. During production runs, on the other
hand, we believe the principle is appropriate to use and its benefits greatly
outweigh any possible loss in error detection. During production runs of
embedded software or system software, there is little benefit in halting ex-
ecution as soon as a potential memory corruption occurs (in fact, many
memory corruption errors may not lead to significant failures, so halting
execution immediately could be premature). This has been demonstrated
and exploited in work on failure-oblivious computing [78]. The benefits of
ensuring memory safety despite such errors (while avoiding the overheads
of garbage collection) are much more significant for such software.
Type Homogeneity Principle for Heap Safety
Using the above principle directly, one naïve but impractical and incorrect
solution is to separate the heap into disjoint pools for distinct data types
and never allow memory used for one pool to be reused later for a different
pool. This is impractical because it can lead to large increases in the instan-
taneous memory consumption. The worst-case increase for a program with
N pools would be roughly a factor of N − 1, when a program first allocates
data of type 1, frees all of it, then allocates data of type 2, frees all of it, and
so on. More importantly, the simple solution is incorrect because it would
allow errors that make the results of the compiler’s pointer analysis invalid,
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and therefore invalidate any static checks that use pointer analysis (includ-
ing our stack safety, and array bounds checking algorithms). This is briefly
discussed below and is the main subject of Dhurjati’s dissertation [30].
An technique that partitions the heap into type homogenous memory
partitions should enforce that a dangling pointer can only refer to objects
from the same pool as the original object. In addition, a dangling pointer
can only refer to objects pointed by pointers that are aliased to the dan-
gling pointer according to the pointer analysis (such as DSA). Violating the
latter property can invalidate the results of the pointer analysis. Consider
the following sequence: free(q); . . .; p = malloc(. . .). If q is still us-
able (i.e., it is a dangling pointer) and p has reused the memory freed by
q since they point to the same pool, then it is essential that p and q are
aliased according to the pointer analysis. In other words, the pointer analy-
sis can be no more precise than the segregation of objects into pools. Pointer
analysis correctness is essential since other analyses such as stack safety
analysis and array bounds analysis for safety use the pointer analysis for
alias information.
Note that the naïve solution of using one pool per static type would not
ensure correctness of pointer analysis. This is because, in the above ex-
ample, p could reuse the memory of q even though p and q are unaliased
according to the pointer analysis. Thus, *p and *q would be aliased in this
execution even though pointer analysis claimed they were not.
Our solution is essentially a more sophisticated application of this ba-
sic principle, using Automatic Pool Allocation to achieve type-homogeneous
pools with much shorter lifetimes in order to avoid significant memory in-
creases as far as possible. Since our pools are already type-homogeneous,
we simply need to ensure that the memory within some pool P1 is not used
for any other dynamically allocated data (either another pool P2 or heap
allocations within trusted libraries) until P1 is destroyed. This can be done
easily by modifying the runtime library so that memory of a pool is not
released to the system heap except by pooldestroy. With this change,
any reference via a dangling pointer to a pool object will be guaranteed to
reference either the original object or a new object of the same type and
alignment as the original, and belonging to the same pool. This ensures
that the basic principle described above is satisfied.
Note that the approach preserves the semantics of the pointer analysis,
viz. DSA (This is treated formally in [30]). Informally, a dangling pointer
through the restriction above can only point to freed memory corresponding
to the same type and with the same alignment in the type-homogenous pool
corresponding to its DS Node. This enforces that it can be aliased to other
pointers pointing to this DS Node, which is exactly equivalent to the results
of the DSA pointer analysis. Note that our solution based on Automatic Pool
Allocation ensures that the results of DSA are correct but if some static
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analysis (e.g., array bounds checking) used a more precise pointer analysis
than DSA, the results of such a pointer analysis may be illegal for some
executions due to dangling pointer references.
2.4 Control-C: Memory Safety Without
Run-time Overhead or Garbage
Collection
The goal of this part of our work is to provide a programming environment
for embedded system, which guarantees memory safety without run-time
software checks or garbage collection. To this end, we develop a language,
Control-C, which is C with some semantic restrictions that enable guaran-
teeing memory safety through static analysis without run-time overhead
or garbage collection, but still makes it expressive enough to program a
broad class of embedded and control applications. In particular, the lan-
guage should be able to utilize complex pointer based data structures and
permit explicit deallocation. Also, we do not want introduce any program-
mer annotations, in order to eliminate any porting effort for legacy codes.
To achieve this goal, we first examine the causes of memory safety violation
in type-unsafe languages:
1. Bad casts: When a memory location is used as two or more different
types due to casting from one type to another.
2. Uninitialized pointers
3. Dangling pointers to freed memory
4. Array bounds violation: Indexing the array beyond its size causes
memory safety violation. Pointer arithmetic and array accesses are
treated uniformly in C.
5. Dangling pointers to the stack: A pointer to a stack location allocated
within a function, after the function returns.
Further, we first discuss the semantic restrictions imposed in Control-C.
These restrictions are basic restrictions that enforce type-safety. We then
discuss analyses to address the memory safety implications of each of the
above memory errors. An early version of Control-C was highly restrictive,
but was still useful in programming control applications. This described in
our paper [60] and has been documented in appendix A. The work described
in this chapter is necessarily a superset of (and is far less restrictive than)
the initial version of Control-C and has been published in [32] and [33].
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Memory safety without run-time overhead is an extremely difficult, if
not impossible, goal for type-unsafe languages. As a result we impose cer-
tain semantic restrictions on these languages. Note that we avoid any new
language mechanisms or syntactic changes, in order to avoid significant
porting effort. First of all, we restrict ourselves to programs that follow
basic type-safety rules. Second, some languages constructs such as un-
analyzable array references and pointers to stack-allocated memory that
outlive stack frames, make it impossible to ensure memory safety without
run-time software checks. We reject programs that have these constructs.
This approach of imposing semantic or usage restrictions on a program-
ming language for the purposes of analyzability has been adopted in other
attempts at defining languages for safety-critical systems such as SPARK-
Ada [8]. Failure to comply with our restrictions can necessitate run-time
software checks for programs that do not adhere to our restrictions or pro-
gram restructuring to adhere to Control-C language rules. In this work, we
do not insert any run-time checks wherever necessary and instead simply
reject input programs that require them. Although, extensions to this work
by Dhurjati [30] can handle all kinds of type-unsafe constructs in C or C++.
This has been described in section 2.10. Finally, our semantic restrictions
have been defined in a language-independent way on the low-level virtual
machine (LLVM) instruction set [63]. Thus our restrictions and the accom-
panying analyses which operate on LLVM can be used for programs in any
source language by compiling it to LLVM.
2.5 Assumptions in Control-C
Achieving memory safety and preventing memory access errors under the
constraint that we permit explicit memory deallocation instead of requiring
an automatic memory management and that we avoid any run-time soft-
ware checks before program operations, is a challenging one. We require
some run-time support and certain system assumptions, which we consider
acceptable for a majority of embedded platforms (hardware + OS). These
assumptions are summarized below.
First, we make some assumptions about the runtime environment. We
assume that certain run-time errors are safe, i.e., the runtime system can
recover from such errors by killing the applet, thread, or process executing
the untrusted code.
We assume a safe run-time error is generated if either the stack or the
heap grows beyond the available address space.
We assume the system has a reserved address range and any access to
these addresses causes a safe run-time error, typically triggered by a page
fault handler or by a reserved address range in hardware on systems with-
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out virtual memory management. In practice, embedded platforms vary
widely in their addressability.
• In standard Linux implementations with 32-bit addressing, the high
end of the address space is reserved for the kernel (typically 1GB out
of 4GB). Our technique to handle null pointer dereferences described
in Section 2.7.1 is most suited to such platforms, where we avoid run-
time software checks.
• Smaller embedded platforms with 16-bit and even 8-bit addressing
typically do not have a reserved address range. In these cases, null
pointer checks must be inserted before every load or store.
Rule (P2) in section 2.7.1 requires that the size of any structure not exceed
the size of the reserved address range. In the event that a program contains
a structure larger than the size of the reserved address space, the program-
mer can either restructure the code to use smaller structures or run-time
null pointer checks are necessary for any references to the structure.
We assume that certain standard library functions and system calls are
trusted and can be safely invoked by the untrusted code (calls whose ar-
guments must be checked are discussed in Section 2.8). We assume (and
check) that the source code of all other functions is available to the com-
piler. We also require that the program be single-threaded.
2.6 Basic Language Restrictions
The first set of restrictions are the typing rules that are summarized be-
low. We assume a low-level type system including a set of primitive integer
and floating point types, arrays, pointers, user-defined records (structures),
restricted union types, and functions.
(T1) Our type system is the same as that of the C language, but is further
restricted by rules T2 and T3.
(T2) Casts to a pointer type from any other type are disallowed, except cer-
tain pointer-to-pointer casts for compatible targets. Permitted casts
include casts between pointers to primitive types of the same size or
casts from a pointer to a primitive type to a pointer to a primitive type
with a smaller size.
(T3) A union can contain only types that can be cast to each other, e.g., a
union cannot include a pointer and a non-pointer type.
Rule (T3) is similar to Rule (T2) as unions are implemented using casts.
The exceptions to Rule (T2) are essentially reinterpreting casts for the tar-
get numerical value. Note, however, that if the pointer points to an array,
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the resulting pointer would have no size information and hence any sub-
sequent array index operations would likely be rejected as unsafe by the
array bounds checking algorithm (Section 2.8). Explicit array declarations
are just as in C, i.e., they need to specify the size of each dimension, except
for the first dimension of an array formal parameter. Enforcing the above
rules is trivial in LLVM [63], where all operations are typed and only an
explicit cast instruction can be used to perform any type conversion.
2.7 Safety of Pointer References
Memory safety of pointer references is violated through uninitialized point-
ers, dangling pointers to the stack and dangling pointers to freed heap
memory.
2.7.1 Uninitialized Pointers
We employ two restrictions, (P1) and (P2) below, in addition to our require-
ment that the runtime system have a reserved address range, to ensure
that an uninitialized pointer (scalar or an element of an aggregate object)
is either never dereferenced or results in a safe run-time error.
(P1) Every local pointer variable must be initialized before being refer-
enced, i.e., before being used or having its address taken.
(P2) Any individual data type (i.e., not an array) should be no larger than
the size of the reserved address range.
Our compiler prevents errors due to uninitialized pointer values by sta-
tically checking that the program honors rules (P1) and (P2). Rule (P1) is
motivated by the following code snippet, disallowed by our language:
int a, *p, **pp; pp = &p; print(**pp); p = &a;
Here, the address of uninitialized pointer p is taken before it is initial-
ized, thus making **pp potentially unsafe. Such uses are difficult to de-
tect statically (because the use may be in a different function), and even a
flow-sensitive interprocedural algorithm is likely to lead to false errors. We
prefer to disallow taking the address of an uninitialized pointer. We use
a standard global data flow analysis to check rule (P1) above, that consid-
ers only local scalar pointer variables. (Note that interprocedural analysis
is not required for identifying uninitialized variables, since any variable
needs to be initialized in the calling function before it is passed as an argu-
ment).
Detecting uses of uninitialized values for global variables and for point-
ers within dynamically allocated data (e.g., structure fields or array ele-
ments) is difficult at compile time. Type-safe language implementations
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usually initialize pointer fields in aggregate objects to null and use run-time
null pointer checks to detect uses of uninitialized values. In order to avoid
performing such checks explicitly in software, we initialize all uninitialized
global scalar pointers, and all pointer fields in globals and dynamically allo-
cated data structures at allocation time, to point to the base of the reserved
address range. This is enabled by our typing rules, which ensure that the
type of each dynamically allocated object is known statically. Pointer fields
in stack-allocated variables of aggregate types are also initialized to the
same value. This includes arrays of pointers in the aggregate type which
are initialized in a loop only once at allocation time. Finally, the constant 0
used in any pointer-type expression is replaced with the same value. Rule
(P2) above specifies that the size of any individual structure type2 cannot
exceed the size of the reserved address range. With this rule, the above
initialization ensures that the effective address for the load or store of any
scalar variable or structure field using an uninitialized pointer (e.g., p->X,
where p is uninitialized) will fall within the reserved address range, thus
triggering a safe run-time error. If a reserved address range is unavail-
able or the structure size restriction above is unacceptable, then explicit
software checks for null pointer references would be required.
2.7.2 Stack Safety
The second way in which pointer usage can lead to unsafe memory behavior
(problem (b) in section 2.6) is when a pointer into a stack frame of a function
is live after the lifetime of the function. This potentially arises when the
address of a local variable is made accessible after the function returns.
To avoid this problem, many type-safe languages like Java disallow taking
the address of local variables. We choose to be less restrictive: we disallow
only placing the address of a stack location in any heap location or global
variable, or returning it directly from a function (rule P3 below). Microsoft
CLR’s type system system [44] has exactly this restriction.
(P3) The address of a stack location cannot be stored in a heap-allocated
object or a global variable, and cannot be returned from a function.
Rule P3 can be enforced using a simple traversal of the Data Struc-
ture Graph for each function, checking whether any stack-allocated object
is reachable from the function’s pointer arguments, return node or glob-
als. Note that this is equivalent to traditional escape analysis for detecting
upwards-escaping objects. This algorithm is shown in detail in figure 2.7.
2An array does not need this size restriction. An uninitialized pointer used as an array
reference will be caught by the array bounds checker since the array will have no known size
expression.
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DSG(F) : Bottom-up data structure graph for function F
ReachableNodes(N, F): DS Nodes reachable from Node N in DSG(F)
for (each function F in program M)
for (each DSNode N in DSG(F))
if (N is pointed to by an argument or return value of F or global )
for (each DS node N’ in ReachableNodes(N, F))
if (N’ contains an ’S’ (stack) flag)
Report ‘‘Rule P3 violated by N’’’
Figure 2.7: Stack Safety Algorithm
2.7.3 Heap Safety
The most challenging aspect of guaranteeing memory safety without run-
time checks or garbage collection, is guaranteeing safe dereferencing of
pointers to the heap in the presence of explicit deallocation. Our approach
relies on the type homogeneity principle, developed in prior work as dis-
cussed in section 2.3.3. We reiterate the principle here:
(Type homogeneity principle) If a freed memory block holding a single object
were to be reallocated to another object of the same type and alignment, then
dereferencing dangling pointers to the previous freed object cannot cause a
type violation.
As discussed in section 2.3.3, this principle can be exploited by applying
it to ensure program safety after the pool allocation transformation. The
key idea is that we do not free memory from a pool to the system when the
memory is deallocated. This enforces that memory in a pool is reused for
other allocations in the same pool, but not across pools. This was achieved
by simply modifying the runtime memory to only return memory to the
system upon pooldestroy, but reuse memory released upon poolfree
for other objects allocated in the pool. With this change, any reference via a
dangling pointer to a pool object will be guaranteed to reference either the
original object or a new object of the same type and alignment as the orig-
inal, and belonging to the same pool. This ensures that the basic principle
described above is satisfied. This approach however, can result in an in-
crease in memory consumption, which we examine in detail in section 2.7.3.
As noted in section 2.3.3, applying the type homogeneity principle after au-
tomatic pool allocation preserves the pointer analysis results.
Our technique, which exploits the type homogeneity principle, can re-
sult in dangling pointers dereferencing stale data or reallocated memory.
However, it is important to note that the dangling pointer can only access
memory within the same thread. Since a pool only contains memory from
a single thread, the memory can only be reallocated to the same thread.
Therefore, in the event of a dangling pointer dereference in the core compo-
nent, the dangling pointer can only access memory within its own thread
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and cannot inadvertently access data in a non-core component. This is vital
to the property verified in the following chapter (chapter 3): explicit com-
munication between core and non-core components (threads).
Detecting Potential Increases in Memory Consumption
The key issue with our approach to heap safety is memory consumption.
The change to the pool allocation runtime library above prevents reuse of
memory between two simultaneously live pools. This can have the same
disadvantage as the naïve type-based pools — the memory requirement of
the program could increase. Note, however, that our pools are much more
short-lived than in the naïve approach and are tied to dynamic data struc-
ture instances in the program, not static types. We expect, therefore, that
during the lifetime of a pool, the most important reuse of memory (if any)
is within the pool rather than between the pool and other pools. Only the
latter causes any potential increase in memory consumption. Nevertheless,
any such increases are likely to be of significant concern to programmers of
embedded systems.
The goal of our further analysis is to distinguish the situations outlined
above, and inform the programmer about data allocation points where po-
tential memory increases can occur. We can classify each pool P into one of
three categories:
Case 1 (No reuse): Between any poolfree for pool P and the pooldestroy
for P , there are no calls to poolalloc from any pool including P itself. In
this case, there is no reuse of P ’s memory until P is destroyed. Figure 2.8(a)
illustrates this situation. Note that all poolfree calls to P can be elim-
inated as a performance optimization. This is essentially static garbage
collection for the pool since its memory is reclaimed by the pooldestroy
introduced by the compiler.
Case 2 (Self-reuse): Between any poolfree operation on pool P and
the call to pooldestroy for P , the only poolalloc operations are to the
same pool P . In this case, the only reuse of memory is within pool P , and
the explicit deallocation via poolfree ensures that no increase in the pro-
gram’s memory consumption will occur. This is illustrated in Figure 2.8(b):
after the first poolfree on p1 there are new allocations in pool p1 (via the
function addItems), but not by any other pool.
Case 3 (Cross-reuse): Between the first poolfree operation on P
and the pooldestroy for pool P there are poolalloc operations for other
pools. Pool p1 in Figure 2.8(c) falls in this category because there are alloca-
tions from pool p2 via the call to addItems(p2,t). Our transformation in
this case may lead to increased memory consumption, and we require this
to be approved by the programmer via a compiler option. In such situations,
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(a) No reuse (case 1)
p1 = poolinit(s);
t = makeTree(p1);
while(...) {
processTree(p1,t);
freeSomeItems(p1,t);
}
freeTree(p1,t);
poolDestroy(p1);
(b) Self-reuse (case 2)
p1 = poolinit(s);
t = makeTree(p1);
while(...) {
processTree(p1,t);
freeSomeItems(p1,t);
addItems(p1,t);// self-reuse
}
freeTree(p1,t);
poolDestroy(p1);
(c) Self and cross-reuse (case 3)
p1 = poolinit(s);
t = makeTree(p1);
while(...) {
processTree(p1,t);
freeSomeItems(p1,t);
addItems(p1,t); // self-reuse
addItems(p2,t); // cross-reuse
}
freeTree(p1,t);
poolDestroy(p1);
Figure 2.8: Example illustrating 3 types of reuse behavior for a pool p1.
the programmer would first analyze or profile the memory consumption of
the code, focusing on data structures assigned to Case 3 pools identified by
our classification algorithm. Typically the programmer has the following
choices:
(a) Often, the increase in memory with Case 3 pools is acceptable. These
are cases where there is limited wasted memory from pools with over-
lapping lifetimes, in spite of not freeing memory back to the system
(possibly due to a lot of pool memory self-reuse).
(b) In some situations, the source code of the program could be restruc-
tured to avoid Case 3 pools. For instance, since our calls to poolinit
and pooldestroy are at the entries and exits of functions, enclosing
the use of a data structure from the point it is first used till its last
use within a function potentially moves the pooldestroy for the pool
34
earlier in the program. However, Case 3 pools are sometimes unavoid-
able if there are long-lived data structures with overlapping lifetimes.
Furthermore, standard software engineering practices tend to mini-
mize the number of Case 3 pools. Examples include separating long-
lived and short-lived data into distinct data structure instances, avoid-
ing long-lived pointers to short-lived data, and modular program de-
sign (especially confining data structure instances within functions).
These observations are supported by our experimental results, which
show that Case 3 pools occur in few of our benchmarks, and the in-
crease in memory consumption is small.
Note that the pool in our running example of Figure 2.6 has only self-
reuse, and we can guarantee memory safety without any increase in mem-
ory consumption. Our experiments in Section 2.9 have produced very few
instances of Case 3; they occurred only in 3 out of the 20 embedded and con-
trol programs we examined, and none had significant increased in memory
consumption due to the change to the pool runtime library.
Amongst the three cases, Case 2 pools are the only pools where there
is self-reuse, which result in a dangling pointer potentially dereferencing
reallocated memory. In conservatively designed embedded systems, only
case 1 and case 3 pools are permitted, completely eliminating the potential
dangling pointer dereferences.
Compiler Algorithm for Categorizing Pools
We have developed a compiler analysis to categorize pools into the three
cases described above. This algorithm is run after the Automatic Pool Allo-
cation transformation as shown in Figure 2.9, and identifies to which group
each pool belongs. For this static analysis, each call to poolinit() is a dis-
tinct pool. When analyzing a particular function, each distinct pool descrip-
tor (which may be a formal argument or a call to poolinit()) is treated
as a potentially distinct pool.
Categorizing pools requires analyzing the potential order of execution of
pool operations across the entire program, using an interprocedural con-
trol flow analysis. Automatic Pool Allocation records information about
the pools used in each function and the locations of calls to poolalloc,
poolfree and pooldestroy inserted for each pool. Pool pointers are
passed between procedures but they are not otherwise copied and their ad-
dress is never taken, so each pool pointer variable declared within a func-
tion identifies a distinct pool.
The algorithm for identifying and categorizing reuse within and across
pools is shown below:
FreeSites(F,P) : set of call sites in F that may call poolfree on pool P
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directly or indirectly
AllocSites(F,P): set of call sites in F that may call poolalloc on pool
P directly or indirectly
PoolsFreed(F) : set of pool arguments of F that may have a poolfree in
F or one of its callees
PoolsAlloced(F): set of pool arguments of F that may have a poolalloc in
F or one of its callees
// Analyze direct and indirect calls to poolalloc, poolfree and
// pooldestroy and classifies pools in a function
AnalyzeFunction(Function F)
begin
BBfreesBefore(BB) : set of pools freed but not destroyed on some
path to the beginning of basic block BB
BBfreesAfter(BB) : set of pools freed but not destroyed on some
path to the end of basic block BB
BBdestroys(BB) : set of pools destroyed in basic block BB
for (each basic block BB in F)
initialize BBfreesAfter(BB) with pools freed in BB
initialize BBdestroys(BB) with pools destroyed in BB
BBfreesAfter(BB) = BBfreesAfter(BB) - BBdestroys(BB)
while (change) // forward propagate frees on pools, kill free upon
// destroy
for (each basic block BB in F in a reverse post-order traversal
of the CFG)
BBfreesBefore(BB) = Union of BBfreesAfter(pred(BB)) for
all predecessors of BB
BBfreesAfter(BB) = BBfreesAfter(BB) UNION
(BBfreesBefore(BB) - BBdestroys(BB))
Recompute change
// Classify pools as Case 1, 2 or 3
for (each call site AI in AllocSites(F,P))
AIBB: basic block corresponding to AI
BBdestroysBeforeAI = set of pools destroyed before AI in AIBB
BBfreesBeforeAI = BBfreesBefore(AIBB) UNION
(set of pools freed preceding AI in AIBB)
for (Pool P1 in (BBfreesBeforeAI - BBdestroysBeforeAI))
if (P1 == P) Add (F, P1) to ‘‘Case 2 Pools’’
else Add (F, P1) to ‘‘Case 3 Pools’’
if (!(Case 2 or Case 3))
Add (F, P) to ‘‘Case 1 Pools’’
end;
// Propagate calls to poolalloc and poolfree interprocedurally and
// analyze pools in each function
AnalyzeProgram(Program M)
begin
for (each SCC in CallGraph of M in post-order)
while (change = true)
change = false
for (each function F in the SCC)
// Compute AllocSites(F,P), FreeSites(F,P),
// PoolsFreed(F) and PoolsAlloced(F)
for (each pool pointer variable P in F)
// formal argument or local variable
for (each call site CS in F that has P as an argument)
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for (each function CalledF that can be called
at CS)
if (CalledF is poolfree for P OR
PoolsFreed(CalledF) contains P)
if (FreeSites(F,P) does not contain CS)
change = true
add CS to FreeSites(F,P)
if (P is an argument of F)
add P to PoolsFreed(F)
if (CalledF is poolalloc on P OR
PoolsAlloced(CalledF) contains P)
if (AllocSites(F, P) does not contain CS)
change = true
add CS to AllocSites(F,P)
if (P is an argument of F)
add P to PoolsAlloced(F)
for (each function F in the SCC)
AnalyzeFunction(F)
end;
We say a function F (or a call site C) indirectly calls a pool operation
(e.g., poolfree) if it calls some function that may directly or indirectly call
that operation. The sets FreeSites(F,P) and AllocSites(F,P) respec-
tively identify the call sites within function F that directly or indirectly
invoke poolfree and poolalloc on pool P. The sets PoolsFreed(F) and
PoolsAlloced(F) respectively are sets of incoming pools (i.e., formal pool
pointer arguments to function F ) for which F may directly or indirectly call
poolfree or poolalloc.
Consider first a single-procedure program containing calls to poolfree,
poolalloc and pooldestroy. The analysis then traverses paths from a
poolfree on a pool to the pooldestroy calls on that pool, looking for
all calls to poolalloc that appear on such a path. This is shown as rou-
tine AnalyzeFunction in the algorithm. AnalyzeFunction contains an
iterative forward dataflow algorithm, which, for each program point, com-
putes the set of all pools that are freed but not destroyed along some path
to the point. For each basic block BB, the sets BBfreesBefore(BB) and
BBfreesAfter(BB) represent these sets at the entry and exit of the block.
The set BBfreesBefore(BB) is simply a union of the sets
BBfreesAfter(p) for all predecessor blocks p of BB. A pool in the set
BBfreesBefore(BB) is propagated to BBfreesAfter(BB) unless there
is a call to pooldestroy on that pool in BB. Each iteration is a linear-time
traversal of the basic blocks, and we have found that there are only a small
constant number of iterations in practice (as expected because this dataflow
problem has the acyclic propagation property [1]). Every poolalloc call is
then analyzed by checking for calls to poolfree on undestroyed pools on
any path preceding it. This is computed using BBfreesBefore for the ba-
sic block corresponding to the poolalloc call and the set of pools freed but
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not destroyed in the basic block before the poolalloc call. Pools are cate-
gorized based on the instances of poolfree (if any) found on such paths.
Consider next an input program without recursion. The algorithm then
makes a bottom-up traversal of the call graph, computing the four kinds of
sets above for each function. The bottom-up traversal ensures that the sets
PoolsFreed(C) and PoolsAlloced(C) will be computed for all possible
callees C of a function F, before visiting F. To compute the sets for F , we
visit each call site S in F and add this call to FreeSites(F,P) if it causes
an invocation of poolfree(P), and to AllocSites(F,P) similarly. We
also add each pool so encountered to PoolsFreed(F) or PoolsAlloced(F).
We assume that pooldestroy on a pool is only called at the function in
which the pool is created and hence we do not need to propagate these calls
interprocedurally. We can now invoke AnalyzeFunction(F) directly to
classify all pools in F. Note that AnalyzeFunction(F) makes no distinc-
tion between local and indirect calls to poolfree/poolalloc for pool P
since both kinds of call sites are included in FreeSites(F,P) and
AllocSites(F,P).
To handle recursive and non-recursive programs uniformly, we actually
perform the bottom-up traversal on the Strongly Connected Components
(SCC’s) of the call graph. Within each SCC, we use a simple iterative al-
gorithm in which the sets are propagated from a function to its call sites
within the SCC until the sets FreeSites(F,P) and AllocSites(F,P)
stabilize for all functions F in the SCC and every pool P. Once they have
stabilized, the sets can be propagated from each function in the SCC to
every call site of that function outside the SCC. AnalyzeFunction is then
applied to each function F in the current SCC as explained earlier.
2.8 Array Safety
Array bounds violations are a very cause for memory safety violation. The
language restrictions and accompanying static analyses to detect array bounds
violation are a part of Dhurjati’s dissertation [30] and are summarized here
for completeness. Dhurjati has evolved the following restrictions for array
operations in order that they can be checked statically:
On all control flow paths,
(A1) The index expression used in an array access must evaluate to a value
within the bounds of the array.
(A2) For all dynamically allocated arrays, the size of the array must be a
positive expression.
(A3) For every reference of an array A, either the index expression in the
array reference must be a provably affine transformation of the size
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of A or the following must hold.
(a) the array reference has to be inside a loop;
(b) the index expression in the array reference must be a provably
affine transformation of the vector of index variables of enclosing
loops;
(c) the bounds of the enclosing loops must be provably affine trans-
formations of the size of A and outer loop index variables or vice
versa; and
(d) if the index expression in the array reference depends on a sym-
bolic variable s which is independent of a loop index variable
(i.e., appears in the constant term in the affine representation),
then the memory locations accessed by that reference have to be
provably independent of the value of s.
(A4) A set of trusted library routines with specified preconditions may be
used, and arguments passed to those routines must satisfy the pre-
conditions.
(A5) The last element of a character array cannot be accessed by the pro-
gram (trusted library calls like strlen can access it).
The main reason for rules A1 to A3, which enforce that all array accesses
are affine, is that static bounds analysis is fundamentally limited by the
tractability of analysis of constraints on symbolic integer expressions. A4
enables us to allow trusted string and I/O library routines that make use of
arrays. A5 ensures that string routines will not read beyond the size of the
array by initializing the last character in any array of characters to be null.
The array bounds analysis accompanying these rules is an interproce-
dural context-sensitive constraint propagation algorithm that generates a
set of constraints on which each array index expression is dependent, until
it discovers the size of the array. Then, these set of constraints are inputted
to an integer constraint solver like Omega [57]. The constraint solver re-
ports if the index expression is safe, i.e., within the bounds of the array.
2.9 Results
We now evaluate the effectiveness of our above techniques for guarantee-
ing memory safety on a broad class of embedded and control system bench-
marks. We address the following questions:
1. How much effort is required to convert existing embedded programs
to conform to our semantic restrictions?
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2. Are the pool allocation transformation and heap safety analysis pow-
erful enough to enforce pointer and heap safety statically in different
embedded programs?
3. How often do we encounter pools from each of the three categories in
these programs?
4. How much does the heap safety transformation affect the execution
time and the memory usages of the programs ?
5. Are the semantic restrictions and static analyses for stack safety suf-
ficient for existing embedded programs?
6. Are the array restrictions and bounds-checking algorithm flexible enough
to permit existing embedded programs (without extensive changes)?
Pools
Uninit. Stack Safety
Categorizing
Pointers
LLVM
Object code
C++
C
Array Safety Safe Code
Type Safety
Existing Infrastructure
Analyses developed in this work
GCC Linker
LLVM Data Structure
Analysis
Pool Allocation
Figure 2.9: Implementation of Analyses
2.9.1 Implementation
We have implemented a safety checking compiler that includes all the com-
piler techniques described in this paper, using the LLVM compiler infrastruc-
ture. Figure 2.9 is a high level block diagram showing the sequence of
steps we use to enforce safety. Previously existing compiler components
are shown by shaded boxes and the rest are new components developed for
the complete system developed with D.Dhurjati. We have also modified our
runtime pool allocation library so it does not release free memory in a pool
back to the system heap until the pool is destroyed.
2.9.2 Methodology and Porting Effort
Our test programs were derived from two embedded application benchmark
suites: 13 fromMiBench [48] and 4 fromMediaBench [65] (Of the other pro-
grams in MediaBench, two fail pool allocation and one is not accepted by
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Benchmark Lines of Lines of Code Lines of Code
Code Modified Modified
for type safety for array safety
control
Pendulum 300(Average) 0 0
Pendubot 1300(Average) 0 31
TinyOS apps 300(Average) 0 0
automotive
basicmath 579 1 3
bitcount 17 5 0
qsort 156 0 1
susan 2122 1 0
office
stringsearch 3215 0 3
security
sha 269 0 1
blowfish 1502 1 5
rijndael 1773 3 6
network
dijkstra 348 0 0
telecomm
CRC 32 282 0 1
adpcm codes 741 0 0
FFT 469 0 0
gsm 6038 0 0
multimedia
g721 1622 11 0
mpeg(decode) 9839 0 0
epic 3524 7 0
rasta 7373 25 0
Totals: 20 41769 70 53
Table 2.1: Benchmarks, code sizes, and source changes
the current LLVM C front-end), two classes of experimental control codes,
and sensor network applications. MiBench consists of embedded programs
from a variety of domains including telecommunications, security, network-
ing, etc. MediaBench are predominantly multimedia programs. In addi-
tion, we tested a set of PID controllers for an inverted pendulum running
on the Simplex real-time architecture [81], LQR state space controllers for
the Pendubot experiment from the controls laboratory at the University of
Illinois, and real-time sensor applications in sensor networks running on
TinyOS [52]. We believe that these programs cover a wide variety of em-
bedded applications used in practice. The applications that our LLVM C
front-end or the pool allocation pass currently refuse to compile are similar
to the ones that we report here with respect to code size (except ghostscript)
and in usage of dynamic memory and we do not expect the results to change
qualitatively for the remaining benchmarks.
The program rasta used a library called libsphere whose source was
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Benchmark Heap and Stack Array
Pointer safety safety safety
(Case)
control
Pendulum Yes Yes Yes
Pendubot Yes (Case 1) Yes Yes
TinyOS apps Yes Yes Yes
automotive
basicmath Yes Yes Yes
bitcount Yes Yes Yes
qsort Yes Yes Yes
susan Yes (Case 1) Yes No
office
stringsearch Yes Yes Yes
security
sha Yes Yes Yes
blowfish Yes Yes Yes
rijndael Yes No Yes
network
dijkstra Yes (Case 2) Yes No
telecomm
CRC 32 Yes Yes Yes
adpcm codes Yes Yes No
FFT Yes (Case 1) Yes No
gsm Yes (Case 1,2) Yes No
multimedia
g721 Yes Yes No
mpeg(decode) Yes (Case 1,3) Yes No
epic Yes (Cases 1,3) Yes No
rasta Yes (Cases 1,3) Yes No
Totals: 20 20 19 11
Table 2.2: Benchmarks and analysis results
not available. The experiments for rasta assumed that this library is safe
and checked the safety of the available source. Also, for each of the pro-
grams above, we designate library and system calls (file reading and writ-
ing routines, for instance), whose source is unavailable, as being trusted.
This is safe since we manually enforce that each of these programs is linked
only to trusted libraries.
The benchmarks, their sizes, and our results for each are shown in Ta-
ble 2.1 and 2.2.
We found that a few lines of code had to be changed in several bench-
marks to conform to our rules, particularly for type safety and array safety.
These are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 2.1. The largest
changes were for rule (T3) in rasta, Pendubot, and g721. All the three
programs used unions with incompatible types; rasta had a union with a
float and an array of four chars to swap the bytes of the float value, and
g721 did the same for an unsigned int. We rewrote the code using shift
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Benchmark Execution Time (secs)
Orig time heap safety exec ratio
time
automotive
basicmath 1.667 1.672 1.00
bitcount 0.710 0.727 1.02
qsort 0.405 0.404 1.00
susan 0.670 0.675 1.01
office
stringsearch 0.024 0.024 1.00
security
sha 0.145 0.138 0.95
blowfish 0.713 0.722 1.01
rijndael 0.340 0.366 1.07
network
dijkstra 0.340 0.349 1.02
telecomm
CRC 32 1.463 1.53 1.04
adpcm codes 1.255 1.252 1.00
FFT 0.495 0.478 0.96
gsm 1.979 1.959 0.98
multimedia
g721 0.354 0.355 1.00
mpeg(decode) 0.331 0.320 0.97
epic 0.126 0.128 1.01
rasta 0.124 0.125 1.01
Table 2.3: Execution time andmemory usage for heap safety approach. exec
ratio is the ratio of execution time after pool allocation to the original time.
(A ratio of 2 means the program runs twice as long as the original)
operations and eliminated the union. The benchmark epic used a wrapper
around malloc to check the return value of malloc and to exit the program
if it were null. This resulted in casts from char* to a pointer to the type
being allocated after each call to this wrapper function. We replaced the
wrapper function with a plain malloc call in order to prevent these casts.
The return value check however is preserved since these calls to malloc are
converted into poolalloc and the return value of malloc is checked by the
poolalloc library function. The other changes for type safety were very
small. For instance, we needed to initialize local pointer variables before
use within their parent function. Also, the fread and fwrite system calls
take a char* value as their first argument, leading to a cast from an arbi-
trary pointer to a char* before it is passed as argument. This violates rule
(T2) and also prevents pool allocation from being applied to the object be-
ing passed in. We have defined separate trusted wrapper functions around
fread and fwrite for each primitive non-pointer type and we changed the
source code to use the appropriate wrapper functions. (Programs that read
non-primitive data from a file would be rejected.)
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Benchmark Memory Usage (bytes)
Orig mem pool alloc mem pool alloc mem
usage mem usage ratio 1 + safety ratio 2
restriction
automotive
basicmath 16384 16384 1 16384 1
bitcount 16384 16384 1 16384 1
qsort 24576 24576 1 24576 1
susan 253952 253952 1 253952 1
office
stringsearch 16384 16384 1 16384 1
security
sha 24576 24756 1 24576 1
blowfish 24576 24756 1 24576 1
rijndael 24576 24576 1 24576 1
network
dijkstra 32768 32768 1 32768 1
telecomm
CRC 32 16384 16384 1 16384 1
adpcm codes 0 0 - 0 -
FFT 540672 540672 1 540672 1
gsm 24576 24576 1 24576 1
multimedia
g721 24576 24576 1 24576 1
mpeg(decode) 385024 401408 1.04 401408 1
epic 671744 681616 1.01 779920 1.14
rasta 147456 212992 1.44 212992 1
Table 2.4: Memory usage of the heap safety technique. mem ratio 1 is
the ratio of the memory usage of program after pool allocation to that of
the original program. mem ratio 2 is the ratio of the memory usage of
pool allocated program with our safety restriction to that of just the pool
allocated program
For the array safety rules, we had to rewrite a few lines of code in 8 pro-
grams. The changes were generally minimal and obvious. For instance,
in blowfish a command line argument was accessed by iterating and
checking if the last character was null, which had to be rewritten to use
strlen() for the loop bound and using an induction variable in the while
loop which depends on the strlen(). In another case (search_string), an
array of strings was accessed in a while loop with the index variable unre-
lated to the bounds. We had to rewrite the code to make the access obey our
language rules described in Section 2.8.
Besides requiring very few modifications, the changes themselves were
simple and local and in most cases obvious from reading the code or from
compiler error messages. Overall, we believe the porting effort to use our
compiler for standard C programs is small to negligible.
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2.9.3 Effectiveness of Pointer and Heap Safety
Analysis
The Heap and Pointer Safety column in Table 2.2 shows that our compiler
was able to enforce safety of heap and pointer usage for all 20 programs we
studied. More precisely, the DSA and pool allocation techniques together
are sufficiently precise to partition the programs heap data into type ho-
mogeneous pools (after the few changes to these programs we made to en-
sure that the programs pass our type safety requirements). About half
the benchmarks use no dynamic memory allocation (though they still use
pointers). For the other benchmarks, the same column shows the different
categories of pools found in each one. The results show that we were able to
prove heap safety without increase in memory consumption (i.e., Case 1 or
Case 2 pools — no reuse or only self-reuse), for all 13 MiBench benchmarks,
1 of the 4 MediaBench programs, and all the control programs.
Only three programs, mpeg2decode, rasta and epic, have pools with
cross-reuse by other pools (Case 3). In practice, our experimental results
(see table 2.3, table 2.4 and Section 2.9.3) have shown that these do not re-
sult in a significant increase in memory consumption. The three programs,
mpeg2decode, rasta and epic make extensive use of dynamic memory,
yet they contain very few pools that fall under Case 3: just 4 of the 8 pools
in mpeg2decode, 3 of 12 in epic, and 19 of 80 in rasta.3 In fact, all the
case 3 pools in mpeg2decode, rasta, and epic also have self-reuse from
the same pool, so that the effect of not freeing memory to other pools is
mitigated. We have also observed that some case 3 pools in these three
benchmarks can be converted to case 1 or 2 with more sophisticated com-
piler analyses where the pooldestroy on a pool is moved as close to the
last poolfree on the pool as possible without compromising safety [64].
Another interesting use of dynamic memory is seen in dijkstra, where
a linked list is live throughout the program and the program repeatedly al-
locates and deallocates memory. In a language with explicit regions such
as Cyclone [47] or RT-Java, this list would have to go on a garbage collected
heap or incur a potentially large memory increase. In our technique, the
case 2 pool allows reuse of memory within the pool. Finally, there were a
number of Case 1 pools, which are amenable to the optimization of turn-
ing off individual object frees entirely, effectively performing static garbage
collection with no increase in memory usage.
3The specific number of pools and numbers of case 1, 2 and 3 pools depend on the precision
of DSA and pool allocation. We have made several improvements in DSA and pool allocation
since our initial experiments [32], leading to larger numbers of total pools and larger numbers
of case 2 and 3 pools in epic, rasta, and mpeg2decode. Nevertheless, the overall results
are qualitatively similar, and our new measurements of memory consumption show that the
impact on peak memory consumption of these codes is negligible.
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Evaluation of Run-time Costs of Heap Safety
In Table 2.3 and 2.4, we present our results on evaluating the run-time
costs of the heap safety approach. Since we do not insert any run-time array
bounds checks in this work, the programs rejected by our array bounds
checker are actually unsafe. We include their execution times only to show
the effect of the pool allocation transformation on performance. First, we
compared the execution times of these applications after the pool allocation
transformation used for heap safety to the original execution time. Most
of the execution times after pool allocation are within 2% of the original
execution time and only one program shows an increase of 7%. In some
cases, we can even see that the pool allocation transformation improves the
execution time. These results show that our heap safety mechanism only
results in a marginal increase (if any) in execution time.
Next we measured the maximum memory usage of these programs. To
identify the causes for increase or decrease in memory consumption, we
measured the usage in three versions: original program, pool allocated pro-
gram, and pool allocated program along with our safety restriction that
memory cannot be released to the system until pooldestroy. Our other
analyses (stack safety, array safety, etc.) do not change the memory con-
sumption of the program. To better understand the numbers, we first give
a brief description of our pool allocation run-time library. The library inter-
nally manages memory using malloc and free. To amortize the allocation
costs over various allocation requests it mallocs memory in multiples of
pages of size 1K bytes. It releases memory to the system if it has more than
a threshold number of free pages.
The column “Mem ratio 1” in Table 2.3 shows the memory increase due
to pool allocation when compared to the original program. The increase is
insignificant in most programs except rasta, where it is 44%. We found that
rasta has many global pools which allocated a total memory of 8 bytes while
we were reserving a page of 1024 bytes for each such pool in our run-time
library. In general, the total memory usage for these embedded programs
is not high and any wastage (such as in rasta) appears large in percentage
terms but its impact is minor in practice. If we decrease the page size to
512 bytes, we found that memory increase reduced to 28%, showing that
a well-tuned pool allocation run-time library that dynamically increases
page sizes depending on the allocation requests can do much better than
our simple untuned version.
We then measured the additional increase in memory usage due to our
safety restriction. As mem ratio 2 illustrates, only epic, which has a Case
3 pool, shows an increase (of 14%) due to the additional safety restriction.
Other programs with Case 3 pools, rasta and mpeg2decode, do not show
any increase.
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Overall, our results indicate that Case 3 pools occur infrequently even
in complex embedded programs and typically never occur at all in simpler
programs. When it does occur, the increase in maximum memory usage
seems acceptable. This is strong empirical evidence that our technique is
powerful enough to enforce heap safety statically in a broad range of em-
bedded programs.
2.9.4 Effectiveness of Stack Safety Checks
Our stack safety check ensures that pointers to the stack frame in a func-
tion are not accessible after that function returns. The stack safety column
of Table 2.2 shows that only 1 program (rijndael) failed this check. This
proved to be a false positive that occurred because Data Structure Analy-
sis is flow-insensitive. In rijndael, a pointer to a local variable is stored
in a global but the global is reinitialized by a callee of the function before
the function returns. Such cases must be handled by restructuring the pro-
gram.
2.9.5 Effectiveness of Array Access Checks
The array bounds checker developed by Dhurjati [32, 33, 30] passed all the
3 classes of control programs, 8 of the 13 benchmarks from MiBench, and
none from MediaBench, after the few changes described earlier. Interest-
ingly, the tests detected 4 potential array bound violations in the MiBench
suite and 2 in MediaBench: one each in dijkstra (both the large and small
versions), epic, and blowfish and two violations in g721. Overall, safety
checking of complex array references remains the most significant obstacle
to our goal of enforcing memory safety with no run-time software checks
for a broad class of embedded applications. As discussed in the following
section, extensions to this work have accepted programs that do not adhere
to the Control-C language restrictions through run-time checks.
2.10 Extensions to the above work
The restrictions of Control-C make it expressive enough to program a large
class of embedded and control systems. However, these restrictions are too
onerous for a large class of non-type-safe low-level codes such as operating
system codes and other complex application software that use the following
constructs:
1. Arbitrary casts: Casting memory between incompatible types, e.g. in-
teger to a pointer
2. Complex array accesses: Non-affine arrays or arrays that are stored
on the heap (thus causing them to be non-affine by our rules).
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3. Dangling stack pointer: The presence of an argument, return value
or global variable that potentially points to a stack location after the
function returns.
Significantly, extending the techniques described in this work to non-
type-safe codes presents an important challenge. Enforcing the semantics
of the pointer analysis and call graph, which is used by the interprocedural
safety analyses described in this work, is non-trivial in the presence of non-
type-safe code constructs. Thus, any technique attempting to use extensive
static analysis to prove memory safety for non-type-safe codes should guar-
antee sound program semantics. Dhurjati [30] has designed the run-time
checks necessary in order to provide memory safety as well as sound se-
mantics for non-type-safe programs. The sound semantics provided can be
used by further static analyses on these non-type-safe programs.
2.11 Related Work
There have been several attempts at providing memory safety. These can be
categorized into safe languages through compiler analyses, language-level
solutions, and purely run-time approaches.
2.11.1 Safe Languages
Embedded systems are mostly written in C and C++. There are several
reasons why existing safe languages are unattractive for embedded sys-
tems. Virtually all safe languages today e.g. Java [45], Modula-3 [17],
Safe-C [6] and CCured [73] rely on garbage collection to ensure that freed
memory locations are not dereferenced, along with run-time software checks
before memory operations such as bounds checks for arrays and null pointer
checks. Real-time garbage collection (GC) implementations have been shown
to incur an execution and memory overhead [9] (of up to 2.5x to achieve
acceptable real-time performance) while non-real-time GC algorithms in-
troduce unpredictable run-time delays and increases in average time and
space. The real-time specification of Java [12] avoids GC entire for subsets
of the heap by providing three additional types of MemoryAreas that are
not garbage collected. Of these, ScopedMemory type defines nested regions
for dynamic allocation. This is more restrictive than our approach and re-
quires run-time checks to ensure that there are no references from objects
in an outer scoped region to an object in an inner one. Additionally RT-Java
inherits run-time checks for null pointers, array bounds, and type coercions.
All the safe languages above as well as systems like Jones and Kelly [56],
which rely on run-time software checks to make C programs safe have pro-
hibitive overheads (upto 500%). Amongst these, CCured has shown the best
48
run-time results so far. CCured extends the C type system to statically in-
fer safe pointers and adds run-time checks for the other pointers. CCured
still uses garbage collection for heap safety and uses pointer meta-data to
perform run-time checks which requires porting effort for library compati-
bility. SafeC uses a fat pointer representation o store spatial and temporal
information for all pointers and uses run-time software checks to detect
memory errors. They report execution overheads of up to 540% and space
overheads of up to 100%.
2.11.2 Language-level Approaches
Region-based languages achieve safety without GC [89, 40, 13, 28], but
have two problems:(a) they require significant porting effort due to the
use of program annotations, and (b) they provide no mechanisms to free
or reuse memory within a region, so data structures that shrink and grow
with non-nested object liefe times must be put in a separate garbage col-
lected heap or incur a potentially large increase in memory consumption.
Both Cyclone and RT Java both include a separate garbage collected heap.
Boyapati et al [13] present a static type system combining ownership types
with region types, to eliminate the run-time checks needed for ensuring
safe region deallocation in RT Java. As a region-based language, they have
the same differences from our work as discussed above. They provide an
additional mechanism based on “sub-regions” of a region for sharing region
data safely across threads, using reference counts to reclaim the data. We
do not support multi-threaded applications so far.
Linear types and alias types [25, 92, 28, 38] have been used to prove
memory safety statically in the presence of explicit deallocation of objects.
They achieve this primarily with severe restrictions on aliases in a pro-
gram, which so far have not proved practical for realistic programs. One
of these languages, Vault [28], also uses such a type system (much more
successfully) to encode many important correctness requirements for other
dynamic resources within an application (e.g., file handles and sockets). It
would be very attractive to use Vault’s mechanisms within our program-
ming environment to check statically key correctness requirements of sys-
tem calls and trusted libraries.
2.11.3 Run-time Techniques
The most significant run-time approach to memory safety has been soft-
ware fault isolation (SFI) [91], which ignores all language-level information
and enforces memory safety by sand-boxing every memory access/jump at
run time. SFI does not detect semantic errors such as array bounds errors,
references to uninitialized values, or accesses to locations in dead stack
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frames. Furthermore, SFI introduces significant and sometimes high run-
time overhead, ranging from 25% to 59% when checking only write refer-
ences and typically over 100% when checking both reads and writes.
A valuable orthogonal strategy for compiler-based secure and reliable
systems is Proof Carrying Code (PCC) [72]. The benefit of PCC is that an
unreliable safety checking compiler can be untrusted, and only a simple
proof checker (which can be made much more reliable) is required within
the trusted code base. Fundamentally, PCC does not change which aspects
of a program require static analysis and which require run-time checking—
that still depends on the language design and compiler capabilities. Thus,
PCC is orthogonal to our work, and could be valuable for taking our safety-
checking compiler outside the trusted code base.
2.12 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we described Control-C, a semantically restricted subset of
C, which is expressive enough to program a broad class of embedded and
control systems, but is guaranteed to be memory safe through our static
analyses without garbage collection or run-time software checks. Memory
safety guarantees fault containment within a software component with re-
spect to memory errors that frequently occur in type-unsafe languages like
C and C++. In addition, our definition of memory safety prevents execution
of illegal system calls from the data area, thus preventing malicious com-
ponents from executing “manufactured” code and hidden system calls. This
enables us to check that an unreliable component only calls trusted system
calls and require that the source of the entire program is available
Ourmost novel contribution is our heap safety technique where, through
the type homogeneity principle, we enforce that dangling pointer deref-
erences do not cause memory safety violations. This technique prevents
safety violations due to dangling pointers while allowing explicit dealloca-
tion (i.e. no automatic memory management). While our technique poten-
tially results in an increase in memory consumption, we established the
specific patterns, where this can actually occur.
We combine our heap safety analyses with a set of language rules for en-
forcing basic type safety, restricted array accesses (the affine restrictions),
and stack safety. Together, we tested our analyses on 20 programs in the
embedded and control systems domain and found that we were able to an-
alyze heap safety for all these programs. Only three programs potentially
had an increase in memory according to our case classification algorithm
and only one program (epic) had a small increase in practice. stack safety
checking failed on one program. The array rules were violated by 9 pro-
grams. Thus, static array bounds analysis remains the main bottleneck for
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static memory safety. We currently require run-time checks for all array
accesses that cannot be statically proven safe.
To extend our programs to an even broader class of embedded systems
written in a type-safe subset of C, two run-time checks may be necessary:
uninitialized pointers if no reserved address space is available and array
bounds checking for non-affine array indexing. Both of these result in run-
time overheads. In the case of uninitialized pointers we are unable to take
advantage of hardware checks and require run-time software checks. For
non-affine array indexing, the index should be checked at run-time before
being used.
2.13 Future Work
Thus far, we have developed compiler techniques to prove memory safety
for single-threaded programs which follow Control-C language rules. Ex-
tensions to this work have implemented run-time checks for the general
class of C programs. These can be found in [30]. Two directions for future
work in this realm are enumerated below:
1. Memory safety of multi-threaded programs - We plan to extend our
current techniques to multi-threaded programs where we guarantee
that memory errors in one thread cannot corrupt the functioning of
the other threads in a program.
2. Memory safety of incomplete programs - Currently, we require the
whole program source to be available in order to guarantee memory
safety. It would be useful to guarantee memory safety of a programs,
which do not contain full source code. This will necessitate annota-
tions for the missing functions in the program source.
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Chapter 3
SafeFlow: Safe Value Flow
in Embedded Control
Systems
In chapter 2, we discussed our techniques to ensure that memory errors
in an unreliable component are contained within the component or result
in safe run-time failures, but do not corrupt other components. However,
control systems consist of critical components which communicate with un-
reliable or untested components and utilize the data generated by these
components. Simply enforcing memory safety does not prevent errors due
to communication of erroneous values across components. Such communi-
cation can be achieved through trusted library calls or code that accesses
shared memory. Erroneous values thus propagated from an unreliable
component to a critical component can lead to critical functionality fail-
ure. While fault containment through partitioning (e.g. memory safety) is
a well-understood problem, erroneous value propagation through trusted
communication channels typically result in fault propagation across com-
ponents. In chapter 1, we observed that the separation principle required
safe value flow from non-core to core components.
We first illustrate a typical control system and show that complete iso-
lation of core and non-core components is impractical using an inverted
pendulum control system (figure 3.1). The pendulum is balanced by the
controller, which periodically reads the track position and pendulum angle
from the sensor and outputs a voltage value between −5V and +5V to the
actuator moving the supporting trolley left or right with different acceler-
ations. The critical functionality of the system is to keep the pendulum
upright at all times. This can be achieved by the core system consisting
of the core controller and the sensor/actuator implemented in hardware.
A controller, which minimizes the jitter of the pendulum while balancing
the pendulum using more complex control algorithms, is implemented sep-
arately as a non-core component, which communicates with the core con-
troller using shared memory. Similarly any user interface, which displays
the status of the controllers by reading the shared memory is a non-core
component.
In general, there is a two-way data flow between core and non-core com-
ponents. For instance, in Figure 3.1, the core controller communicates sen-
sor readings to the non-core controller, which, in turn, communicates its
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Figure 3.1: Running Example: Inverted Pendulum
computed control outputs to the core controller. A unique attribute of val-
ues in control systems is that they quantify properties of the physical world.
This hybrid nature of control systems, due to the continuous dynamics of
the plant and the environment ensures that values exhibit continuity. This
enables the core subsystem to maintain a conservative model of the phys-
ical system, which can be used to verify safety and system recoverability
properties of unreliable values generated by the non-core subsystem. As in
any other domain, it is difficult, if not impossible, to check the correctness
of values such as control outputs (e.g. output voltage of the inverted pendu-
lum controller) if they are in a permissible range (e.g. [−5,+5]V). However,
the core subsystem can take advantage of the model to verify that the sys-
tem remains in a recoverable state if a non-core value is utilized by the core
subsystem. This kind of a safety check is termed a monitor.
Examples of such monitors abound in control system design. In Fig-
ure 3.1, the core component can use a stability envelope, represented by a
Lyapunov function within the admissible states, proposed by the Simplex
architecture [82] as a run-time monitor to check that the system remains
in a recoverable state if a non-core control output is applied to the plant.
The ability to check recoverability has been exploited by Cunha et al [26]
for disaster prediction and avoidance in control systems. In our own expe-
rience with autonomous car controllers at UIUC [46], control outputs are
monitored for potential collisions with other cars or obstacles before being
applied to a car actuator.
The broad goal of this chapter is to enforce the following property in the
actual system implementation (in C):
Safe Value Flow Paths: All non-core values flowing into a core
component should be monitored before use in critical computa-
tion
This verifies that the core subsystem does not have any unmonitored value
dependencies on non-core values (The correctness of the monitor itself is
assumed and verifying it is outside the scope of this work). Ding and Sha
have described this requirement as a prerequisite to the core component
using the non-core component, but not depending on it [34]. This is a re-
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finement of the conventional notion that there exists a failure dependency
if there is any data flow between two component [69].
Lampson has defined three channels of value flow between components
in the security context: legitimate, covert, and storage [61]. While legiti-
mate channels of information involve communication through variables in
the local process context, storage channels use environment objects and
covert channels use means that are not reflected in values stored anywhere
in the system (e.g. execution time). In this work, we only address legit-
imate channels of value flow from non-core to core components. Particu-
larly, through the work, we assume that all communication is performed
through shared memory (Message passing extensions are briefly discussed
in section 3.2.4). This is a reasonable assumption since shared memory
communication is frequently used in embedded control systems for its fine-
grained flexibility and the potential run-time efficiency. While covert chan-
nels are not relevant in the context of dependability, value flow through
storage channels needs to be addressed in future work.
There are three distinct sources of low-level implementation errors that
can violate the safe value flow property above. Firstly, programming bugs
can cause the core component to use non-core values without monitoring
along some path. This is particularly important as the number of paths
in the core component increases, making it difficult to inspect manually.
Secondly, programmers can use unmonitored non-core values due to inad-
vertent accesses to non-core values in shared memory. The primary reason
for such accesses is that, in C, pointers to shared memory are not locally
distinguishable from other pointers. Interprocedural propagation of shared
memory pointers can result in inadvertent accesses to shared memory lo-
cations in the core component. The third source of implementation errors
is subtler in nature. Core component developers often make assumptions
regarding the safety of certain shared memory locations and rely on the
encapsulation of the non-core component, synchronization and atomicity,
data format compatibility and other pre-conditions that are difficult to ver-
ify. Previous work that verifies these properties (see section 3.4) have been
best-effort in nature. Violation of any of the above properties results in the
propagation of unreliable values to the core component that should be run-
time monitored. In this sense, the safe value flow property is foundational
and offers a “last line of defense” against many difficult-to-detect interac-
tion errors.
We have designed SafeFlow, a static analysis tool that detects poten-
tial value dependencies of core components on the non-core subsystem.
Static analysis offers the benefits of incurring no run-time overheads and
early error detection, which are attractive advantages for embedded sys-
tems (run-time error dependency detection incurs performance penalties).
Assuming that monitors are correctly implemented, SafeFlow relies on a
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few simple and local programmer annotations to describe semantic infor-
mation about monitors, critical data, and shared memory initialization in
the core component. Also, C programs have many language features that
make them difficult to analyze statically. Hence, SafeFlow takes advantage
of the domain-specific uses of shared memory and imposes a few reasonable
semantic restrictions on shared memory pointer usage.
The SafeFlow analysis precisely identifies all uses of unmonitored non-
core values communicated through shared memory to core components at
development time. Importantly, it reports errors for all unmonitored non-
core values that affect critical data within the core component. A secondary
contribution of SafeFlow is the simple and succinct annotation language
that is useful in representing semantic information in embedded C pro-
grams. We applied SafeFlow to three prototype control systems and dis-
covered five critical erroneous value dependencies of the core subsystem
on non-core values. There are two main limitations to SafeFlow. First,
SafeFlow can produce a few false positives due to control dependence on
non-core values not used in critical data computation and due to impreci-
sion of the static analysis. We currently require that the errors are verified
using the value flow graphs manually. Secondly, erroneous annotation of
an inaccurate or incomplete monitoring function can cause it to miss real
dependencies (false negatives). This problem is nearly impossible to elimi-
nate, though we mitigate it by designing a simple annotation language.
3.1 Basic Approach
Consider a core component, which communicates with non-core components
using a set of shared variables. For each shared variable, Si, we define the
following mutually exclusive predicates:
• noncore(Si) : holds if x can be written by any non-core component
• core(Si) : holds if it can be verified that x is only written by core com-
ponents. (core(Si)⇒ ¬ noncore(Si) and noncore(Si)⇒ ¬ core(Si))
Strictly applying the noncore predicate to shared variables that can be
written by non-core components helps us detect dependencies on non-core
values that arise due to difficult-to-detect bugs in inter-component inter-
action such as data format compatibility and synchronization. For a local
value in the core component, x, we define the following mutually exclusive
predicates:
• safe(x) : holds if x is defined by the core component or if its value is
not dependent on any non-core values
• unsafe(x) : holds if x is dependent on any non-core values. (unsafe(x)
⇒ ¬safe(x) and safe(x)⇒ ¬ unsafe(x))
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We now define the following operational rules for shared variable access
in core components:
• Shared memory read: For x = read(Si),
noncore(Si)⇒ unsafe(x) and
core(Si)⇒ safe(x)
Reading a non-core shared variable returns an unsafe local value.
Also, reading a core shared variable returns a safe local value.
• Shared memory write: write(Si, x)
Writes to a shared variables, Si, using a local value in the core com-
ponent does not modify the truth values of core(Si) and noncore(Si).
This is because non-core shared memory locations are assumed to be
accessible to non-core components throughout their lifetime. Verifying
the absence of data races and the correctness of synchronized accesses
is difficult and cannot be assumed.
Using the above operational semantics, all reads of non-core shared vari-
ables by the core component only return unsafe values. However, as dis-
cussed earlier, core components in control systems contain run-time mon-
itors for non-core values, which read non-core values and check them for
safety before using them. In order to handle this, the programmer identi-
fies functions where the non-core shared variable, Si, is monitored before
use (termed a monitoring function for Si), specifying that core(Si) holds
within this function. Thus, using our operational rules, reading Si within
this monitoring function returns safe local values. The programmer is ex-
pected to verify that the monitoring function correctly checks the non-core
values for safety (or recoverability) before storing it in local variables that
escape the monitoring function or using it in computation of critical data.
This facility enables core components in control systems to safely read non-
core values.
In the following section, we use the above principles to design a simple
annotation language, which encodes semantic information in the core com-
ponent, and statically analyze the core component to detect unsafe non-core
value propagation to critical core component data.
3.2 SafeFlow Analysis
In the previous section, we described our basic approach in identifying mon-
itoring functions and using this information to analyze the core component
for unmonitored non-core value accesses that propagate to critical data.
In this section, we first describe the annotations that we require from the
developer, which provide semantic information about monitoring functions
and critical data. In order to use this information in our analysis, we need
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to address two key issues that arise in weakly typed languages such as C,
which makes sound and precise analysis of programs challenging: (a) mem-
ory errors and (b) aliasing and type-unsafe language constructs. To address
(a), we leverage our prior work on guaranteeing memory safety and enforc-
ing the semantics of the pointer analysis results in the presence of memory
errors. To address (b), we impose a reasonable set of restrictions on shared
memory pointer usage, by exploiting the limited ways in which embedded
control systems use shared memory. These restrictions enable us to stati-
cally analyze the core component to precisely identify unmonitored non-core
value access as well as erroneous dependencies with few false positives.
SHMData *noncoreCtrl;
SHMData *feedback;
float decision(Feedback* f,
float safeControl,
SHMData *noncoreCtrl)
/***SafeFlow Annotation
assume(core(noncoreCtrl, 0,
sizeof(SHMData))) ***/
1: if (checkSafety(feedback, noncoreCtrl))
2: return noncoreCtrl->control;
3: else
4: return safeControl;
}
main()
{
1: void *shmStart;
/* Initialize shared memory */
2: shmid = shmget(SHMKEY, SHMSize, flags);
3: shmStart = shmat(shmid, 0, 0);
4: feedback = (SHMData *) shmStart;
5: noncoreCtrl = feedback + 1;
6: Lock(shmLock);
7: while (1)
8: {
9: float *output;
10: getFeedback(feedback);
11: computeSafety(feedback,
&safeControl);
12: Unlock(shmLock);
13: wait(tsecs); /* Wait for non-core
component to compute value */
14: Lock(shmLock);
15: output = decision(feedback,
safeControl, noncoreCtrl);
/***SafeFlow Annotation
assert(safe(output)); ***/
16: sendControl(output);
17: }
}
Figure 3.2: Example: Core Controller Code
In order to explain our analysis, we use the example in Figure 3.2, which
is a simplified version of the core controller in the Simplex architecture
implementation for the inverted pendulum [81] from figure 3.1. In each
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period, the core controller dispatches a control output to the actuator in
order to balance the pendulum. The output of the non-core controller is dis-
patched, if it can be checked to maintain the system in a recoverable state
by the decision module. Otherwise a safe control output, computed by
the core controller, is applied to the actuator. The routine, main, allocates
the shared memory using the UNIX system call (lines 1-3) and initializes
the global variables, noncore and feedback, to point to shared memory
(lines 4-5). Within the loop, during each period, the core component re-
ceives feedback about the position of the pendulum, which is published in
shared memory (line 10), computes the safe control output (line 11), waits
for the complex controller to publish its computed control output (line 13),
checks the non-core component output for recoverability in the function,
decision, and sends the appropriate control output to the actuator (line
16). The goal of our analysis is to detect unmonitored non-core values in the
core component and enforce that the critical value in the core component,
output, does not depend on any unmonitored non-core values.
3.2.1 Annotations
One of our major goals in this work is to incur minimal or no burden on the
programmer in verifying safe value flow in the system. Thus, we ensure
that our approach requires minimal programmer annotations. Moreover,
we require that annotations are local, succinct, and intuitive to the pro-
grammer. Our analysis requires two kinds of semantic annotations from
the programmer: (a) Identifying critical data and (b) Characterizing mon-
itoring functions. In general, annotations are undesirable since they pre-
clude using the technique on legacy code without some porting effort and
incur a burden on the programmer. However, annotations in our approach
are unavoidable since they describe semantic information only known to
the developer. On the flip side, imposing annotations on the programmer
has the advantage that it enforces a discipline with respect to identifying
critical data and the behavior of monitoring functions.
Our annotations are enclosed within C comments which begin with the
special string, SafeFlow Annotation, as shown in figure 3.2. There are two
kinds of annotations: assume annotations that provide semantic informa-
tion about monitoring functions that can be used as facts by the analysis
and assert annotations that specify the property that must be checked or
validated by the analysis.
Monitoring functions need to specify that certain memory locations in
shared memory can be assumed to be core in the function and in any func-
tion invoked recursively by the monitoring function. For this purpose, the
assume annotation is declared using the predicate core, which is applied
to a shared memory pointer, shmptr as follows:
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core(shmptr, offset, size) , which denotes that the shared memory
locations accessible using shmptr from offset, offset, for size bytes can
be assumed to contain core values. Offset and size values should span an
entire array in shared memory, since an array is treated as a single unit by
our analysis; otherwise, the annotation becomes ineffective.
In other words, the values read from these locations will be safe accord-
ing to our operational rules in section 3.1. This annotation is illustrated in
the function, decision, above the function body in figure 3.2, which spec-
ifies that the shared memory pointer, noncoreCtrl, can be dereferenced
safely between offsets 0 and sizeof(SHMData). This annotation is local
and can be specified in terms of local or global shared memory pointers.
Also, the monitoring function developer clearly knows the locally shared
memory locations that are being monitored and used in that function.
The other semantic information we require for our analysis is the iden-
tification of critical data in the core component. Here, we need to specify
the requirement that this critical data is safe i.e. it does not depend on
non-core values. For this purpose, we employ the assert annotation on
the safe predicate, which takes a primitive typed variable such as char,
int, float, or double). Its syntax is simply the following:
safe(x), which denotes that the local value x is safe.
This is illustrated in the annotation preceding line 16 in main in figure 3.2.
In general, annotations that identify the critical data in the core component
are inserted at program points preceding communication with another com-
ponent through an I/O operation. Similarly, the arguments to system calls
such as the process-id argument to kill are asserted to be critical data in
the core component. The assert annotations required by our analysis are
much simpler than the assertion invariants in [68], which attempt to cap-
ture the functionality of the system (That work has shown that specifying
the latter is not easy for all programmers).
In addition to the above annotations, in our implementation, we need
some annotations to describe the shared memory pointers returned by un-
typed sharedmemory initializing functions. This is described in section 3.2.2.
3.2.2 Language Restrictions
Generally, precisely checking safe usage of unreliable values in components
written in weakly typed languages like C is statically undecidable. While C
is extensively used in programming embedded system components, it per-
mits many type-unsafe constructs including pointer arithmetic, arbitrary
casts and even memory errors, due to which it is impossible to precisely
identify shared memory accesses statically in generic C programs.
The first issue posed by type-unsafe constructs and memory errors is
that the local pointers in the core component could access shared memory
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in arbitrary and unpredictable ways via bounds violation, dangling pointer
dereference or uninitialized pointer dereferences. In order to counter this,
we propose to leverage our previous work on memory safety. In [33], we
proposed a restricted type-safe subset of C, which we statically analyze to
guarantee memory safety. We essentially propose a combination of static
analysis, minimal (often zero) run-time checking and some system support
(only to minimize the run-time overhead) to ensure that uninitialized point-
ers, type-unsafe casts, dangling pointers to freed memory or stack memory,
and array bounds violation do not overwrite any data area not allocated by
the component. In our case, since shared memory is allocated through the
shared memory libraries, our analysis and language restrictions enforce
that local pointers in the core component cannot access any shared mem-
ory locations. In a follow-up work [31], we describe the additional run-time
checks required to guarantee memory safety (in fact, the stronger property
of guaranteeing the semantics of the pointer analysis results) for practically
the full generality of C.
The second consequence of type-unsafe constructs is imprecision in track-
ing shared memory location accesses leading to a greater number of false
positives in a conservative analysis. To statically analyze value flow pre-
cisely, we impose a few semantic restrictions on shared memory pointer
usage. This enables better precision , ensures expressiveness to program
practical embedded systems, and handles legacy systems with minimal
porting effort.
We enforce that a pointer to shared memory cannot be aliased and ar-
rays in shared memory cannot be indexed. Without such restriction, it
would be impossible to statically analyze the component. Also, we require
that shared memory is not deallocated or destroyed until the end of the pro-
gram (the end of function main). This prevents dangling pointers to shared
memory in the program. Dereferencing dangling pointers to system-defined
shared memory can have unpredictable consequences such as crash failures
of the core component. The restrictions are as follows: (P1) Shared mem-
ory cannot be deallocated until the end of the main function; (P2) Taking
the address of a pointer to shared memory is disallowed; and (P3) Casts
between pointers to incompatible types in shared memory and casts from
shared memory pointers to integers is disallowed.
In addition , we adapt the restrictions on arrays in our previous work [33]
to the arrays in shared memory:
(A1) Indices used to access arrays within shared memory must lie within
the bounds of the array
(A2 ) If an array in shared memory, A, is accessed inside a loop, then: (a) the
bounds of the loop must be provably affine transformations of the size
of A and outer loop index variables or vice versa;(b) the index expres-
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sion in the array reference, must be a provably affine transformation
of the vector of loop index variables, or an affine transformation of
the size of A; and(c) if the index expression in the array reference de-
pends on a symbolic variable s, which is independent of the loop index
variable (i.e., appears in the constant term in the affine representa-
tion), then the memory locations accessed by that reference have to be
provably independent of the value of s.
Rule P1 above prevents dangling pointers to shared memory. Rule P2
disallows aliasing shared memory pointers by storing them in memory. P3
ensures that the shared memory is used in a type-safe manner. The array
rules A1 and A2 verify that the arrays in shared memory do not violate
their bounds. In general, inability to distinguish statically between array
locations results in an array index operation conservatively assumed to be
anywhere within the span of the memory locations represented by the ar-
ray.
...
initComm(key_t SHMKEY, size_t SHMSize,
FLAGS flags)
/***SafeFlow Annotation
assume(shminit); ***/
{
1: void *shmStart;
/* Initialize shared memory */
2: shmid = shmget(SHMKEY, SHMSize, flags);
3: shmStart = shmat(shmid, 0, 0);
4: feedback = (SHMData *) shmStart;
5: noncoreCtrl = feedback + 1;
/***SafeFlow Annotation
assume(shmvar(feedback,
sizeof(SHMData))) ;
assume(noncore(feedback));
assume(shmvar(noncoreCtrl,
sizeof(SHMData)));
assume(noncore(noncoreCtrl));
***/
InitCheck(shmStart, SHMSize,
feedback, sizeof(SHMData),
noncoreCtrl, sizeof(SHMData));
}
main()
{
1: initComm(SHMKEY, SHMSize, flags);
2: Lock(shmLock);
...
Figure 3.3: Initialization function
Shared Memory Initialization
In addition to the assume and assert annotations described in section 3.2.1,
we require one other annotation in order to facilitate our analysis. This is
due to shared memory allocation through systems calls (in UNIX for in-
stance) being untyped, which necessitates shared memory pointer casting
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and pointer arithmetic in order to initialize shared memory. These con-
structs violate the restrictions on shared memory pointer usage described
above. Moreover, due to the type-unsafe constructs, the sizes of arrays in
shared memory need to be made explicit. We also require annotations to
specially designate that these initialization routines do not require to ad-
here to our language restrictions.
For instance, lines 1-5 of main in figure 3.2, the pointer returned by
the call to shmat is cast to a pointer to a structure of the returned type
(violating rules P3). In order to overcome this, one option is to write and
invoke typed wrappers for these system calls for each required type. This
is clearly onerous on the developer. In our approach, we designate that the
initializations are performed in a special function known as the initializing
function, identified by the assume annotation using the predicate shminit.
The predicate, shminit, permits P3 to be violated.
To overcome the type-unsafe initialization of shared memory, the initial-
izing function needs to be annotated to identify the shared memory vari-
ables and their respective sizes. For this purpose, we employ assume an-
notations on the predicate shmvar, which takes the typed shared memory
pointer as the first argument and the total size of the shared memory loca-
tions that can be accessed through the pointer as the second argument:
shmvar(shmptr, size)
The size of the array pointed to by the shared memory pointer can be in-
ferred by dividing the size of the shared memory, size, by the size of the
type pointed to by shmptr. It is important to verify that the locations
pointed to by individual shared memory pointers are non-overlapping and
the entire size span of each of these pointers be valid. To annotate that
the set of locations that can be accessed by a shared memory pointer are
non-core, we employ the assume annotation on the predicate, noncore, if
the shared memory locations can potentially be overwritten by a non-core
value. This predicate is applied to a shared memory pointer as follows:
noncore(shmptr)
In figure 3.3, we show an annotated version of initComm with all the
above annotations. The shminit annotation is written just below the func-
tion declaration and applies to the function and any function invoked recur-
sively by it. The shmvar and the noncore annotations are written at the
end of the function and are post-conditions of the initializing function. In
this case, feedback and noncoreCtrl are declared to be two shared mem-
ory variables of size sizeof(SHMData). In order to assist the program-
mer in writing correct size annotations, we automatically insert a run-time
check:
InitCheck(void *SHMStart, size_t SHMSize, ...)
which verifies that the variables in shared memory do not overlap with
each other. If this check fails, the core component is terminated before it
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bootstraps. While this is a run-time check, it is only executed once during
shared memory initialization.
3.2.3 Static Analysis
Our static analysis algorithm operates in three phases on the core compo-
nent implementation: (i) Identification of pointers to shared memory inter-
procedurally; (ii) Enforcing language restrictions P1-P4, A1, and A2; (iii)
Identifying non-core shared memory accesses and determine if critical data
is control or data dependent on unsafe local values. The analysis is im-
plemented on low-level virtual machine (LLVM) byte-code [63], which is a
typed intermediate format that is in static single assignment (SSA) form.
Before the three phases of our analysis, we execute a pre-processing
pass on the C code which converts assume and assert annotations to
calls to external dummy functions. Annotations on monitoring functions
and initializing functions are specified at the entry point of the function.
The post-condition of the initializing function is generated at all the exit
points of the function. In the first phase, we discover the initializing func-
tions in the program and identify the shared memory pointers initialized.
We then propagate these pointers interprocedurally using a bottom-up and
top-down analysis on the strongly connected components (SCCs) of the call
graph. These pointers escape the functions as globals, function arguments
or return values. The post-conditions of initialization functions identify the
pointers to shared memory that escape the function. In the bottom-up pass,
these pointers are propagated to the callers until the root of the call graph
i.e. main is reached. Within each function, a standard global data flow algo-
rithm is used on the basic blocks in the control flow graph (CFG). At merge
points (due to conditionals or loops), a pointer is conservatively assumed to
point to shared memory if it is initialized on some path. Within SCC’s, the
pointers to shared memory are propagated to the callers until the shared
memory pointer information for each function stabilizes. A top-down pass
on the call graph propagates the pointers to shared memory from the root
of the call graph to the callees.
The second phase of our analysis enforces the language restrictions P1-
P3, A1, and A2. According to rule P1 pointers to shared memory in each
function should not be arguments to shared memory deallocation functions
(shmdt for instance). This is easy to analyze by examining all the uses
of the pointer by following def-use chains. P2 and P3 can be similarly
verified by examining the uses of pointers to shared memory within each
function. Casting between types in LLVM necessarily uses the cast in-
struction. Casting a pointer to shared memory to a pointer to an incompat-
ible type is disallowed (P3). P2 is verified by enforcing that a pointer to
shared memory is never stored in any pointer using the store instruction
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in LLVM.
Our restrictions on array indexing are derived from a previous work [33].
Constraints A1 and A2 are verified by generating constraints on each array
index expression in the program interprocedurally. The constraint propa-
gation algorithm is exactly the same as the one developed previously. The
size of the array in shared memory is provided by the annotation in the
initializing function. The set of affine constraints are given to a integer
programming solver such as Omega [57], which checks that there are no
array bounds violations.
The final phase of our algorithm processes the assume annotations in
each function (except the initialization function) and determines the core
set of shared memory locations accessible within each function. This is
compared to the non-core shared memory locations accessed in the function
to determine the unsafe values read from unmonitored shared memory. A
warning is reported for each unsafe access to shared memory, without any
false positives or false negatives. Finally, we enforce that critical data is
not data or control dependent on unsafe shared memory accesses using an
interprocedural value flow analysis on the critical data. An error is re-
ported when the analysis detects dependency of critical data value in the
core component on unmonitored non-core values.
In order to accomplish this, we propagate the predicate, unsafe, which
is applied on pointers and primitive data types loaded from unmonitored
non-core shared memory using the rules below. Note that, in general, a
pointer is unsafe if and only if the data it points to is unsafe.
1. Load : Any value loaded from an unsafe pointer is considered unsafe.
q = load p
unsafe(p) ⇒ unsafe(q)
2. Arithmetic operations: Any data value computed from an unsafe
value is unsafe.
c = add a, b
unsafe(a) ∨ unsafe(b) ⇒ unsafe(c)
3. Branch Merges (Phi nodes in SSA): If a variable is unsafe on
any path, then conservatively this unsafe predicate is propagated on
merging paths.
c = phi(a,b)
unsafe(a) ∨ unsafe(b) ⇒ unsafe(c)
4. Conditionals: If a variable that affects a conditional is unsafe, then
all value definitions that are control dependent on the conditional are
unsafe if (cond) x = y
unsafe(cond) ⇒ unsafe(x)
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5. Function call: Unsafe data or pointers are propagated to and from
functions through arguments, return values, and globals.
6. External libraries: If unsafe data or pointers are propagated to
an external library (whose source is unavailable), then all return val-
ues, accessible globals, and pass-by-reference arguments are consid-
ered unsafe.
We verify the assertion for critical functionality, by checking if the crit-
ical data depends on an unsafe value. We use an alias analysis like Data
Structure Analysis (DSA) [62], which maintains points-to graph and a typed
representation of the memory in the program. DSA is a context-sensitive,
field-sensitive, and flow-insensitive analysis.
The critical data analysis algorithm checks for dependencies on unsafe
data read by the core component from shared memory using an interpro-
cedural, context-sensitive, and flow-sensitive algorithm. Currently, each
function in the core component is analyzed multiple times for different call
sequences leading to it, making the implementation exponential in run-
time complexity. In practice, the core component in an embedded system is
simple and has relatively fewer paths than system software. Moreover, the
overhead due to static analysis time for safety violation detection is not a
significant factor in most development and testing efforts.
In the example in figure 3.2, the shared memory pointer, feedback, is
used in the function, decision (which only annotates noncoreCtrl as
being safe). Thus, any values generated by decision, which depend on
feedback are unsafe. This includes the return value, output, which vio-
lates the critical functionality requirement of the component. The derefer-
encing of feedback in decision is reported as unsafe. One way to elimi-
nate this dependency is to use a local copy of the feedback as an argument
to decision, rather than the pointer to the shared location.
The algorithm can be made more efficient by analyzing each function
only once and summarizing the data dependencies in the functions using
value flow graphs developed in ESP [27]. This ability to summarize proce-
dures means that we can carry out a single bottom-up pass on the SCC’s
in the call graph, inlining the value flow graphs in the callers and using
these graphs to determine if critical data depended on any unsafe accesses
to shared memory.
3.2.4 Discussion and Extensions
False Positives
Our analysis detects false positives, due to two reasons: the imprecision
in our analysis and control dependence on shared memory variables. The
merging of unsafe predicates on variables upon branch merges and the
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path-insensitivity in the final phase of our analysis can result in false pos-
itives, due to errors flagged by infeasible paths. In the future, our analy-
sis could be combined with path-sensitive value flow algorithms such as
ESP [27]. Similarly, the imprecision of the pointer analysis used to check if
any unsafe data is reachable from critical pointer data can also lead to false
positives. While improving the precision of the pointer analysis results us-
ing more aggressive analyses (e.g. making it flow-sensitive) increases pre-
cision, eliminating false positives in all cases is difficult.
The second source of false positives is due to critical data being control
dependent on unmonitored non-core shared memory values. For instance,
in one of our test-cases, the configuration of the system is present in shared
memory. The core component reads the configuration without monitoring it
and computes critical data differently based on the presence or absence of
a non-core component. In one path of execution, the critical data uses the
non-core values after monitoring it. In the other path of execution, the core
component outputs safe data computed by it. The critical data is computed
correctly in either path of execution, but the control dependence on the
non-core configuration data reports an erroneous dependency. The source
of this false positive is due to the inability of the analysis to automatically
infer whether the non-core variables modifying the control flow affect the
critical data computation in the core component. In these cases, manual
inspection of the reported errors is required. However, it is important to
realize that in these scenarios, a superior design would be to restructure
the non-core components by separating out an additional core component
that writes the configuration in shared memory.
Non-core component encapsulation
Due to our conservative model of the non-core component, the core com-
ponent cannot rely on atomicity properties such as writing and reading a
shared variable in sequence and expecting the written value to be read. In
Earlier, we motivated our conservative model of the values produced by the
non-core component as being due to the difficulty of detecting many complex
errors in non-core component behavior. In special cases, more fine-grained
model of non-core component behavior could be exploited, due to guaran-
teed absence of errors such as synchronization errors or data compatibility
errors. This can easily be expressed by using more assume annotations in
the core component to declare shared memory locations to be core within
certain functions. For instance, in the example in figure 3.2, the function
decision could be further annotated with assume(core(feedback, 0,
sizeof(SHMData))), thus declaring feedback to be safe to dereference in
decision and all the functions recursively called by it. A limitation of this
approach is that annotations in our current approach can only be applied at
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the function level and might necessitate restructuring the code to further
modularize the program appropriately.
Message Passing and I/O calls
In this section, we briefly discuss extending our approach above to commu-
nication through message passing and I/O library calls. We define a trusted
set of library calls we can use for receiving messages and performing I/O
reads. We illustrate the required annotations on the library calls using the
example of the recv call on sockets:
ssize_t recv(int socket, void *buffer,
size_t length, int flags);
First, we use the predicate, noncore(socket), to specify that socket
file descriptor, socket, is used to communicate with non-core components.
Otherwise, the socket is assumed to be used for communication with core
components. Additionally, we require that these descriptors are not used in
any computation and merely passed by value across procedures. Socket file
descriptors not annotated as non-core are assumed to communicate with
core components. In practice, the sockets communicating with core compo-
nents need to contain run-time authentication to check that the peer com-
ponents are indeed a part of the core subsystem. Secondly, we use assume
annotations to define that it is safe to dereference received non-core data
within the function. This is exactly the same as the assume(core(...))
annotations in the monitoring functions, except that it is applied to a local
pointer. All other pointers to received data are assumed to be unsafe, being
from non-core components.
In the example below, noncore is deemed safe to dereference, but not
feedback. To facilitate analysis, we require that the address of pointers to
received buffers are not taken and these pointers are not cast to integers.
An annotated snippet of a version of the decision function in our running
example implemented using message recv is shown below:
float decision(float safeControl)
/***SafeFlowAnnot:
assume(safe(noncore, 0,
sizeof(SHMData))); ***/
{
1: n = recv(socket, buffer, length, flags);
2: feedback = (SHMData *) buffer;
3: noncore = feedback + 1;
4: if (checkSafety(feedback, noncore))
5: return noncore.control;
6: else
7: return safeControl;
}
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3.3 Results
Through our experiments, we intend to answer the following questions:
• Is the restricted language expressive enough to develop embedded
control systems?
• Are the annotations onerous on the programmer?
• Does the analysis successfully detect erroneous dependencies on non-
core values in our tests?
System LOC LOC Source Annot.
(total) (core) Changes (LOC) lines count
IP 7079 820 7 (86)(1 func) 11
Generic Simplex 8057 1020 0 22
Double IP >7188 929 7 (88)(1 func) 23
Table 3.1: SafeFlow: Programmer Burden Evaluation
System Error Warnings False
Dependencies Positives
IP 1 7 2
Generic Simplex 2 7 6
Double IP 2 8 2
Table 3.2: SafeFlow: Error/Warning Detection Results
Table 3.1 and 3.2 shows the results of applying our analysis on three
laboratory control systems. All three systems implement the robust archi-
tectural design of isolating the core components and monitoring for non-
core values flowing to the core component. The first system is a Simplex
architecture for an inverted pendulum (IP) controller used to balance an
inverted pendulum as seen in our running example (figure 3.1). The second
is a generic Simplex architecture implementation for simple plants with
a configuration file that can be customized for different plants. The third
system is a double inverted pendulum control system that is based on the
inverted pendulum controller code, albeit with changes to enable additional
control modes. The first two systems have been used in the real-time sys-
tems laboratory at UIUC for three years and have been extensively tested.
In particular, these systems were designed as a demonstration of the Sim-
plex architecture for core component isolation. Much effort has gone into
the development of these two systems, particularly in protecting against
non-core values in the core component. The double IP controller is a rela-
tively new system, whose implementation is currently being refined in our
laboratory. For running our analysis, we used a preliminary version of the
double IP controller.
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In order to apply SafeFlow, we needed to annotate the core components
of the systems with information about shared memory initialization. The
critical data in the core components is the control output being sent to the
actuator and the first argument (process id) of the kill system call in-
voked (annotated using asserts). Finally, we required annotations on the
monitoring function specifying the non-core accesses that are safe to access
within the function. The number of lines of annotation is small in all cases.
In particular, majority of the annotations (9 of 11 lines in IP control, 15 of
22 in generic Simplex, and 15 of 23 in double IP control) were used to an-
notate initializing functions. Notably, no source changes were necessary for
the systems to adhere to our language restrictions. A very small number
of source changes were required in two experiments to separate the moni-
toring function, which was a part of a larger function. This was necessary
because the annotations for the monitoring functions can only be specified
at the function level. In table 3.1, the number of actual lines of source
changed and the diff output of the modified program with respect to the
original program are listed.
The SafeFlow analysis detected several warnings or unmonitored non-
core value accesses in all three systems. These warnings contain no false
positives are a very useful output of the analysis since it makes explicit
all unmonitored non-core values read by the core component. SafeFlow de-
tected two erroneous value dependencies of the core component on the non-
core component in the generic Simplex system, two in the double IP system
and one in the inverted pendulum controller. In the generic Simplex im-
plementation, one erroneous dependency was caused by a shared memory
variable (the sensor feedback value) being written by the core component
and read later by the core component. This potential value dependency
on non-core values would be fatal, if the non-core component replaced the
sensor feedback with a hand-crafted value that would “rig” the recover-
ability check to permit an erroneous non-core value to be used by the core
controller. This could occur due to an erroneous non-core component imple-
mentation, which overwrites the feedback value (which is supposedly read-
only, but not enforced) or violation of the synchronization on the feedback
value in shared memory due to data races.
In all the three systems, the first argument of a kill system call in-
voked by the core component was dependent on an unmonitored non-core
value. This could be easily used to bring down the core component if the
non-core component overwrote the value with the process id of the core
component itself, causing the core component to kill itself! One error in the
double IP controller is a result of accessing an unmonitored non-core value
assuming that this value does not propagate to the critical data in the core
component. Our analysis discovers that this assumption is invalid. It is
important to note that the three systems tested were designed and imple-
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mented to provide safe value flow from non-core to core components. The
five errors we found are very subtle, in that they capture implementation
oversight and erroneous assumptions.
SafeFlow returns a few false positives among its errors. All false pos-
itives returned in our tests were due to control dependence on non-core
values that do not affect critical data computation. These needed to be
manually identified with the aid of the value flow graphs representing the
flow of values from unmonitored non-core values to the critical data. False
positives can be reduced by using the assume annotation to declare such
non-core values as being safe to access within certain functions, only after
reliably verifying this fact.
3.4 Related Work
As described earlier, there have been several architectural designs that em-
ploy monitors to protect core components against non-core values [82, 26,
46]. The notion of isolating critical component functionality has been for-
mally modeled by Arora and Kulkarni [5] in order to build masking fault-
tolerant systems. Further, Jhumka et al [54] have proposed the design of
accurate and complete detectors in such an architectural design. However,
none of these works have addressed enforcing these principles in low-level
implementation and have verified their designs only at the model level,
which is a much higher level of abstraction. We have shown that imple-
mentation errors can easily violate even the simple architectural principle
of safe value flow.
The SafeFlow approach is closest to previous work in taintedness analy-
sis and secure value flow. The taintperl [93] package employs data flow
techniques to quarantine data potentially contaminated by malicious users
(completely preventing the use of such data). Being an interpreted lan-
guage, the taintedness information is tracked at run time. In the context of
security, Denning and Denning [29] first proposed a type system enhanced
with security attributes in order to verify confidentiality and integrity of
variables in the implementation. This has been further refined by Vol-
pano et al [90] and in the design of JIF [71, 80]. None of these works
are suited for the safe value flow property in embedded systems, for two
main reasons: heavy-weight annotations and the lack of a notion of mon-
itoring functions. Moreover, prior work in security typed languages has
not practically addressed applying the techniques to C programs. In con-
trast, the key contribution of SafeFlow is the design of a succinct and light-
weight annotation language to specify monitoring function properties and
language restrictions that enables statically detecting erroneous dependen-
cies. While secure programming languages can be justified to guarantee
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confidentiality and integrity in security-critical applications, safe value flow
demands legacy code compatibility and ease of use by embedded system de-
velopers. Declassification in JIF is the closest analogue to monitoring in
literature, although the semantics are different. We borrow our value flow
graphs to propagate the unsafe predicate on a local variables through the
program from the propagation of security attributes towards guaranteeing
non-interference, for instance. This is also similar to Cqual [84] which con-
tains mechanisms to annotate interface variables with attributes and prop-
agate these attributes through the program (and potentially to assertion or
interface violations).
A key element of our approach is that the reading of non-core values
is automatically detectable by explicitly annotating shared memory initial-
ization, and message receive and I/O library calls. The Ada-SPARK sys-
tem [8] utilizes annotations to make explicit the data flow information in
a program, thus avoiding implicit value propagation errors for a subset of
Ada. Their system was intended at making the behavior of individual func-
tions deterministic and analyzable. Enforcing the guaranteed containment
of propagated value errors from non-critical components has not been ad-
dressed from the point of view of dependability. In fact, using Ada’s explicit
value propagation approach would be useful in eliminating many false pos-
itives in the final phase of our analysis, where we report the critical values
that depend on unmonitored non-core values.
Leveson [69] has developed a manual technique to analyze lines of code
to generate software fault trees for each line of an Ada program. The man-
ual technique and the large size of the fine-grained trees preclude the scal-
ability of the technique. Automatic failure path inference (AFPI) [15] at-
tempts to determine failure dependencies across components through fault
injection and testing methodology, without offering any guarantees
Enforcing locking protocols and detecting data races statically has been
studied extensively, most recently in [35]. Data format compatibility and
access control can be enforced by encapsulating the shared memory reads
and writes by the non-core component and through assumption specifica-
tions in AADL [39]. These techniques are best-effort and do not attempt
to capture all errors. Thus, assuming the absence of such errors is unjusti-
fied in general, motivating SafeFlow to use the conservative model for the
non-core component in its analyses.
3.5 Chapter Summary and Future work
We described SafeFlow, an annotation-based static analysis that verifies
that the core components guaranteeing critical functionality do not depend
on unmonitored non-core values in the system. While monitoring has been
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used extensively in robust architectural design, various implementation er-
rors can violate these architectural principles. The analysis tool enables
core component developers to explicitly track non-core values in shared
memory that are used without being monitored in core components. Fur-
ther, the tool reports erroneous dependencies if these non-core values can
affect critical data computation along some path in the system. Applying
SafeFlow found critical, erroneous or inadvertent value dependencies in
mature critical systems designed for safe value flow, with a few false posi-
tives. The SafeFlow experiments confirm the motivation behind the analy-
sis tool as being a “final line of defense”, complementing other best-effort
error detection tools.
In the future, SafeFlow needs to address other channels of value flow be-
tween non-core and core components, significantly storage channels. Fur-
ther attention is required on eliminating the false positives generated by
SafeFlow.
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Chapter 4
Developing Robust
Embedded Systems
In this chapter, we briefly summarize the contributions of chapter 2 and
chapter 3 and put these contributions in perspective by analyzing the ex-
tent of our achievement towards the broader goal of enabling the system in-
tegration architect to verify architecture-implementation conformance. We
also examine other related efforts and some simple extensions, which are
potentially useful to general-purpose systems or embedded systems that
cannot adhere to the restrictions imposed by Control-C or SafeFlow.
We embarked on this work in order to bridge the gap between the imple-
mentation and robust architectural assumptions or requirements. In order
to do so, we chose a key emerging architectural principle for robustness,
which guarantees critical functionality even in the event of faults in the
non-critical subsystem, the separation principle. The separation principle
comprised three sub-properties: (SP1) spatial separation, (SP2) temporal
separation, and (SP3) safe inter-component interaction. There are a mul-
titude of failures at the implementation level that can violate each of the
above properties. Among the wide spectrum of potential solutions including
formal analysis, dynamic monitoring, static analysis, and system utilities,
we chose a solution based on static analysis with minimal support from
system utilities, dynamic checks, and programmer assistance.
Static analysis for architecture-implementation conformance is employed
by the system integration architect to validate the implementation. In our
analysis, static analysis is directly used by individual developers to ana-
lyze their code: (a) non-core components and core components are coded in
Control-C to guarantee memory sandboxing and no hidden system calls, (b)
the system calls invoked by non-core components is restricted to a safe sub-
set determined by the system integration architect, and (c) the core compo-
nents are annotated by the developer and verified by SafeFlow to run-time
monitor all non-core values read from shared memory. The system inte-
gration architect simply needs to ensure that the components code by the
individual developers have been analyzed by our tools. This can be simply
enforced by modifying the build scripts, such as the makefile. In addition,
the system integration architect needs to enforce that assumptions made
on the run-time system and on the correctness of run-time monitors are
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valid.
Domain Expert
System Integration Architect
Component Developer
Designs the math Architects the Design Develops software components Test-debug cyle
Component Developer
TOOLS USED
Simulink Matlab ADLs, model-checking Testing, Static Analysis for bug-finding
System Integration Architect
Static Analysis for Arch.-Impl Conformance
Assumption Specification
Dependency Analysis / Fault Injection
Figure 4.1: Embedded system development timeline
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the relative position of our tool compared to
the other tools available for system development. The timeline shows the
following phases:
1. The domain expert employs prototyping tools such as Simulink and
Matlab. In a traditional control system, these prototyping tools could
be used to directly program the software components.
2. The system integration architect designs the system to satisfy the
functional requirements (as solved by the domain expert), and, in ad-
dition, also provide non-functional features such as dependability and
security. The system integrator can use architecture description lan-
guages to validate his designs at the modular level. In addition, she
also determines the run-time system utilities required by the individ-
ual components.
3. The individual software developers program their components accord-
ing to the specifications established by the architect. In doing so, they
employ testing and debugging tools (particularly static analysis tools
which try to find common programming errors).
4. The system integration architect verifies that our static analyses for
architecture-implementation conformance have analyzed the core and
the non-core components in the system. In this stage, the system
architect and the individual developers also evolves the assumption
specifications [87], the timing specifications, and performs the failure
dependency analysis on the system.
4.1 Our Approach
Leveraging static analysis has tremendous benefits for embedded systems,
viz., run-time, memory, and power performance, and early error detection.
Our approach towards enforcing high-level properties at the implementation-
level through static analysis is distinct from many alternate approaches in
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literature that employ static analysis. In particular, other work has at-
tempted to use static analysis and/or run-time checking to identify pro-
grammer errors wherever possible, thus providing early feedback to the
programmers in the development cycle. These approaches are “best-effort”
in nature and their main focus is in minimizing the number of false posi-
tives reported. The tools continue to generate false negatives in the form
of bugs that are difficult or impossible to detect by these tools. Our ap-
proach atttempts to provide architectural guarantees at the implementa-
tion level, particularly towards the high-level properties related to guaran-
teeing critical system functionality in the presence of arbitrary errors in
the non-critical subsystem.
Our approach primarily consists of two key steps:
• First, the high-level property to be enforced is carefully selected, keep-
ing in mind that it needs to be guaranteed at the implementation level
statically, with minimal or no run-time checks.
• Using a combination of minimal language restrictions and annota-
tions, sophisticated compiler analyses, judicious run-time checking,
and modifications of the run-time environment to statically guaran-
tee that the high-level property identified in the previous step.
The first step above has proved to be crucial in both Control-C as well as
SafeFlow and is a key insight of this work. We illustrate this in both cases.
Detecting all dangling pointer errors in C is basically an intractable prob-
lem. Thus, in developing Control-C and the accompanying static analyses,
we modify the heap allocation and deallocation routines to allocate many
fine-grained heaps, each of which are type homogenous. In this way, we
can exploit the type-homogeneity principle from section 2.3.3 to guaran-
tee that memory safety is guaranteed in the presence of dangling pointer
dereferences. While verifying strong type safety is sufficient in guarantee-
ing spatial isolation, it is not necessary. Thus, we permit dangling pointer
dereferences in some cases (thus violating strong type safety of the program
in these cases), but ensure that these violations do not compromise memory
safety.
In SafeFlow, we enforce that erroneous values from the non-core sub-
system are run-time monitored by the core components before being used.
There are typically various difficult-to-detect bugs and incompatibilities in
the interaction between the core and non-core subsystem that can violate
the safety of the interaction. For instance, statically verifying the correct-
ness of the locking protocol to access the shared memory is difficult if not
impossible. Similarly, data format compatibility between the critical and
the non-critical subsystem in the message or the shared memory is tedious
to guarantee, particularly when the interface evolves over time. By using
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static analysis to verify that all values read from shared memory are mon-
itored before use, we capture the effect of any arbitrary interaction error
resulting in bad data.
By carefully choosing the property we require to guarantee that the im-
plementation adheres to the architectural design assumptions, we can en-
force that our language restrictions are minimal and retains the expres-
siveness of the language and that we incur minimal (often zero) run-time
overhead, through explicitly inserted run-time checks or due to run-time
system utilities.
4.2 Case Study: Re-designing eSimplex
By applying the techniques described in chapter 2 and 3, we have analyzed
the design of eSimplex for simple control systems including the inverted
pendulum. The results of these experiments have showed us the following
1. The Simplex implementation adheres to the restrictions of Control-
C including the type-safe pointer usage and affine array indexing.
Also, it runs on a system (embedded Linux) which contains a reserved
address space eliminating run-time software checks for uninitialized
pointers. Thus, eSimplex was completely statically verified for mem-
ory isolation, with minimal or no source changes. Our analysis also
enforces that there are no hidden system calls in the data area within
the component.
2. The implementation contains unsafe value propagation paths from
the non-core controller to the core controller. In particular, we found
two critical bugs in both these systems:
(a) A hidden dependency of the safety controller implementation on
the feedback tuple in shared memory that can be overwriten by
the non-core controller. This is either an inadvertent dependency
or a synchronization assumption on the part of the programmer
that can be easily violated by the non-core controller. In particu-
lar, the feedback value can be overwritten with arbitrary values,
which can be used to “rig” the safety check. To fix this problem,
the implementation needs to be modified to use the local vari-
able containing the feedback tuple read from a core sensor, rather
than the non-core value in shared memory.
(b) The SafeFlow analysis inferred that the first argument of the
kill system call (process id) in the core component depends on
a shared memory value written by the non-core component. The
non-core component is expected to register its own process id in
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this shared memory location. This can be overwritten by the non-
core component that leads to the core component killing itself or
other core components. The process id to be killed either needs to
be monitored by the core component or a core component needs to
be separated out of the non-core component, which registers the
process id of the non-core component and monitors it for safety.
Finally, the SafeFlow analyses showed a control dependence of the crit-
ical control value in the safe controller on the values in shared memory
that indicate the configuration of the system. This configuration indicates
the presence or absence of a non-core controllers in the system. Currently,
these parameters are written by the non-core controller. The dependency
detected in the core component is a false positive since the core component
generates critical values correctly irrespective of the configuration. How-
ever, a better design of the system to avoid any future potential erroneous
dependencies on the configuration would be to separate out a core compo-
nent from the non-core component, which writes the configuration of the
system in shared memory. This component would monitor the configura-
tion of the non-core subsystem and only writes reliable (core) configuration
values to shared memory.
4.3 Extensions to Control-C and SafeFlow
The language restrictions on Control-C and the annotations in SafeFlow
are the two most significant bottlenecks to widespread deployment. In this
section we discuss extensions and approaches that can eliminate these re-
strictions, at the expense of additional run-time overheads or programmer
assistance.
4.3.1 Extending Memory Safety to C
Control-C was developed as a part of the SAFECode project at UIUC (see
http://safecode.cs.uiuc.edu). Extending memory safety to the full
generality of C is a challenging task and is not a contribution of this disser-
tation. It has been described by Dhurjati et al in [31, 30]. We summarize
the key results here.
In order to support the full generality of C, we need to relax two signifi-
cant restrictions in Control-C
• Casting between any types including incompatible pointers and pointers-
to-integers and vice-versa.
• Allowing complex array indexing, including using values loaded from
the heap as indices and non-affine indices.
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Enabling the above semantic features in C necessitates adding some
run-time checks in order to guarantee memory safety without garbage col-
lection. In particular, there are two categories of run-time checks thare are
necessary. First, run-time checks are used to verify the safety of incompat-
ible type-casts and for array indexing that cannot be statically proved to be
safe. Broadly, these set of run-time checks verify that a pointer does not
point outside memory allocated to it. The reason for the second category of
run-time checks is subtler in nature. In performing static analysis for val-
idating certain array acccesses and prevention of dangling stack pointers,
we utilize the pointer analysis results and the computed call graph of the
program. However, in the presence of type-unsafe language constructs, the
pointer analysis information and the call graph can become invalid or er-
roneous. This compromises the correctness of our static analyses. In order
to enforce that our static analyses are correct, we need a second category of
run-time checks that enforce the call graph and the pointer analysis results.
In fact, our run-time checks for memory safety additionally guarantees
the semantics of pointer analysis results and call graph results for any
analyses that rely on this information. Enforcing sound alias analysis re-
sults through run-time checks (in turn, optimized using static analyses) is
useful for a large number of static analysis tools such as BLAST [50] and
ESP [27].
In implementing these run-time checks, the goal is to incur minimal
run-time overhead. In order to execute an efficient run-time check, we seg-
regate the memory used in the program to distinct heaps and distinguish
between type-homogenous pools (such as the all the pools in Control-C) and
type-unknown pools for memory used in a type-unsafe manner. We convert
all run-time checks into efficient pool checks. The resulting overhead in-
curred was less than 10% in most of the cases and a maximum of 30% (in
one case).
4.3.2 Safe Shared Memory Library
The SafeFlow analysis combines programmer annotations with restrictions
on using pointers to shared memory. While our simple and local program-
mer annotations enabled us to handle C codes, future systems can poten-
tially employ a more elegant technique based on a safe set of library calls
in accessing shared memory.
We define the following library routines and illustrate their use with
figure 4.2:
void *shminit(key_t key, size_t, size, int flags)
void shmdt(Void *SHM)
bool register_monitor(void *SHM,
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bool (*monitorFunc)(char c, void *MFArgs), size_t offset)
bool register_monitor(void *SHM,
bool (*monitorFunc)(int i, void *MFArgs), size_t offset)
bool register_monitor(void *SHM,
bool (*monitorFunc)(float f, void *MFArgs), size_t offset)
bool writeSHMVal(void *SHM, size_t offset, char val)
bool writeSHMVal(void *SHM, size_t offset, int val)
bool writeSHMVal(void *SHM, size_t offset, float val)
bool readSHMVal(void *SHM, size_t offset, int *val,
void *MFArgs)
bool readSHMVal(void *SHM, size_t offset, int *val,
void *MFArgs)
bool readSHMVal(void *SHM, size_t offset, float *val,
void *MFArgs)
The library function shminit is used to initialize an untyped shared
memory of a given size, associated with a key, and flags indicating permis-
sions. Run-time monitors can be registered for elements within the shared
memory, which are identified by an offset from the beginning of the shared
memory. For this purpose, register_monitor is overloaded to be used
to monitor each distinct data type (in the library routines above, we have
restricted ourselves to char, int, and float). Monitoring functions take
in the value to be monitored as the first argument and a void pointer as the
second argument. The void pointer enables monitoring function to use cus-
tom structures of the inputs used in monitoring. For instance, a monitoring
function for a control value could use a structure with a single floating point
feedback value or an array with a window of feedback values. In figure 4.2,
the run-time monitor, valMonitor, monitors the control value, ctrl, by
using the floating point feedback value as the second argument. Monitor-
ing functions return true if the value is safe and false otherwise.
We do not allow pointers to be explicitly stored in shared memory. The
routine, writeSHMVal, can store values in shared memory at a given offset.
The routine readSHMVal is more complex. It attempts to read the value,
val, of a certain size from a given offset in shared memory. In doing so, it
first checks if there is a monitoring function for the value of this type at the
given offset and returns false if none exist. If there is a monitoring function,
readSHMVal invokes the monitoring function. The function, readSHMVal,
returns false if the argument MFArgs is null or if the invoked monitoring
function returns false. Otherwise, it returns true. The read value is made
available in ∗val. The monitoring function is relied upon to verify that the
arguments passed in as MFArgs is valid. Also, each of register_monitor,
writeSHMVal, and readSHMVal verify that the offset is within the bounds
of the shared memory.
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bool valMonitor(float ctrl, void *Args){
float *feedback = (float *) Args;
...
// Returns true if ctrl is safe
// i.e. ctrl retains the system in a recoverable state
// else returns false
}
main() {
SHMStruct *theSHM;
float feedback = readFeedback();
theSHM = (SHMStruct *) shminit(SHMKey, sizeof(SHMStruct),
FLAGS);
register_monitor((void *) theSHM, &valMonitor,
sizeof(theSHM->fld0));
float ctrl;
if (readSHMVal((void *) the SHM, sizeof(theSHM->fld0),
&ctrl, (void *) &feedback)) {
// ctrl is safe
} else {
ctrl = SAFE_VALUE;
}
sendControl(ctrl);
}
Figure 4.2: Example: Using the safe shared memory library
Using the safe shared memory library, the static analysis required to
enforce that all shared memory values are run-time monitored before use
in a critical operation in the core component reduces to a few simple rules:
1. The shared memory pointer is only used as the first argument of the
safe shared memory library calls and conversely, the first argument
of the safe shared memory library calls should be the return value of
shminit.
2. The function shmdt should be invoked on the shared memory pointer
only at the end of main.
3. The return value of readSHMVal is always checked.
4. The value pointed to by val is safe along the path where readSHMVal
returns true and unsafe along the path where it returns false.
A simple analysis identifies the unsafe values in the core component
and a value flow analysis similar to the one described in chapter 3 is used
to verify that unsafe values do not propagate to critical data in the core
component (identified by the same assert annotation used in chapter 3.
Converting existing programs to use the safe shared memory library in-
volves major program restructuring (More than 300 lines of changes in our
systems, where the core component had 800-900 lines). Hence, the library
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would be most effectively used in systems to be developed in the future and
not for legacy codes.
4.4 Related Work and Future Directions
We motivated the importance and utility of statically identifying imple-
mentation issues that violate architectural precepts. The closest work that
adheres to these goals are language-level solutions. Java [45] guarantees
memory safety and spatial isolation. Additionally, there have been sev-
eral language level solutions to use a combination of annotations and static
inferencing to discover erroneous value flow dependencies, particularly in
the context of secure information flow. JIF [80] contains language exten-
sions to Java, which guarantee properties such as integrity, confidentiality,
and non-interference. The emphasis of JIF has been on a usable language,
making it unique in a long line of work in this area. Java has not been used
extensively in embedded system development because of the unpredictable
nature of garbage colleciton and the run-time checking overhead. More re-
cently, there have been successful efforts at practically enabling real-time
garbage collection [74].
There are a few attractive directions for future work to pursue. We have
addressed single-threaded programs in this work. Extending the architec-
tural properties to multi-threaded codes is still an open challenge. Also, the
techniques used in SafeFlow and the safe shared memory library can be ex-
tended to verifying many other architectural properties such as security
and appropriate filtering of data to guarantee timely data. One such archi-
tecture for filtering feedback to negate the effect of delays or inaccuracies
is proposed in appendix B.
Specifically, with regards to the analyses in this work, three distinct im-
provements can be envisioned. First, our ability to verify safe system call
usage is very coarse-grained. Currently, we simply expect a safe subset of
system calls to be used by non-core components. A more nuanced analy-
sis of system calls and their arguments would leverage static analysis to
aid in guaranteeing temporal separation. Second, in SafeFlow, we ignored
value flow through storage channels such as a value written to disk or com-
mon buffer in the OS by a non-core component, which is read by the core
component. Analyzing these flows will be require a fine-grained analysis of
system call invocation statically and at run-time. Finally, while SafeFlow is
effective at identifying unsafe values accessed within the core component,
verifying that these unsafe values do not affect critical data in the core com-
ponent can result in false positives. This is particularly true if the unsafe
value propagates along a long path before it affects the critical data. While
more accuracy in our value flow analyses can mitigate the number of false
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positives, ranking errors in some priority order would be very helpful to
the programmer in addressing errors in decreasing order of importance or
accuracy.
82
Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we have motivated and established our broad goal of
developing a programming environment supported by a suite of static and
dynamic analysis tools, which verify that the implementation of robust em-
bedded system architectures conform to the assumptions of architecture as
well as the architectural design itself. We identified the main implemen-
tation errors, which violate the architectural assumptions and designs as
being memory errors, logical system resource errors, timing errors, hidden
dependencies due to inadvertent global variables, andmissing architectural
checks on some paths in the system. We have developed static analysis
techniques to verify that these errors do not occur or prevent these errors
from violating the architectural design and assumptions
In particular, we have developed Control-C, which is basically a type-
safe subset of C through semantic restrictions, that guarantees memory
safety statically without run-time software checks or garbage collection.
Significantly, Control-C provides these guarantes, while allowing arbitrary
dynamic memory allocation with explicit deallocation imposing memory
consumption overheads only in a small fraction of the programs. Our exper-
iments have shown that Control-C is expressive enough for a large number
of control and embedded systems, and an even larger class of systems if
we use run-time software checks for complex array accesses. Dhurjati’s
thesis [30] and our paper [31] has furthered this work and enabled guar-
anteeing memory safety with minimal run-time overhead and no garbage
collection for practically the full generality of C.
We also defined the implementation errors that can cause erroneous de-
pendencies of core components on non-core shared memory values in em-
bedded systems. We have developed an annotation mechanism and ac-
companying static analyses to guarantee that critical components always
monitor data from unreliable components before using them. Our analysis
checks that every path contains the architectural monitoring checks and
that there are no hidden dependencies through inadvertent shared vari-
ables accessible to the unreliable components. Our implementation has de-
tected multiple hidden dependencies through an inadvertent shared vari-
able in the different eSimplex implementation of the Simplex architecture.
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Further, we developed a safe shared memory library, which enables de-
velopment of future core components, which communicate with non-core
components safely monitoring all incoming non-core values.
Finally, we have also developed a co-design based architecture to protect
against timing delays in sensor updates and control outputs. Our architec-
ture tolerates communication delays, and sensor and controller restarts.
This architecture is very similar to safe value propagation and our tech-
niques can be easily adapted to annotate timing assumptions and to ana-
lyze that all incoming feedback is filtered through a state estimator, which
validates its timeliness.
All our tools can be integrated to provide a programming environment
for robust embedded system implementation. In order to develop a compre-
hensive system, in addition to the above tools, we also require the assis-
tance of light-weight dynamic monitoring, system utilities, formal methods
or manual inspection, particularly to verify temporal isolation. We have
demonstrated that static analysis reduces our dependence on these utili-
ties, which are either unattractive for embedded systems (run-time over-
heads) or do not scale to real codes (many formal techniques or manual
inspection). Through this work, we have shown that static analysis is a
vital technique to verify architectural assumptions and high-level designs
in the implementation.
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Appendix A
Restrictive Control-C for
control applications
We initially developed a restrictive version of Control-C, which was expres-
sive enough for control applications [60]. In this section, we provide the lan-
guage rules for this restrictive version. The Control-C language restrictions
presented in 2 accept a superset of the programs accepted by restrictive-
Control-C.
A.1 Basic Rules
The first set of rules focus on type-safety, uninitialized pointers, and some
basic issues
(T1) The Control-C language requires strong typing of all functions, vari-
ables, assignments, and expressions, using the same types as in C.
(T2) The language disallows casts to or from any pointer type. Casts be-
tween other types (e.g., integers, floating point numbers, and charac-
ters) are allowed.
(T3) A union can only contain types that can be cast to each other; conse-
quently a union cannot contain a pointer type.
(T4) The language requires that there are no uses of uninitialized local
pointer variables within a procedure. In particular, a pointer variable
must be assigned a value before it is used or its address is taken.
(T5) If the application chooses to exploit assumption (S3) above to avoid
runtime NULL pointer checks, then any individual data object (scalar,
structure, or array, allocated statically or dynamically) should be no
larger than the size of the reserved address range.
(T6) Pointer arithmetic is disallowed in Control-C.
Explicit array declarations are just as in C, i.e., they need to specify the
size of each dimension, except for the first dimension of an array formal
parameter.
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A.2 Array Indexing Rules
Array operations in Control-C must obey the following rules. On all control
flow paths,
(A1) The index expression used in an array access must evaluate to a value
within the bounds of the array.
(A2) For all dynamically allocated arrays, the size of the array has to be a
positive expression.
(A3) If an array, A, is accessed inside a loop, then
(a) the bounds of the loop have be to be provably affine transforma-
tions of the size of A an outer loop index variables or vice versa;
(b) the index expression in the array reference, has to be provably
an affine transformation of the vector of loop index variables, or
an affine transformation of the size of A; and
(c) if the index expression in the array reference depends on a sym-
bolic variable s which is independent of the loop index variable
(i.e., appears in the constant term ~q in the affine representation),
then the memory locations accessed by that reference have to be
provably independent of the value of s.
(A4) If an array is accessed outside of a loop then
(a) the index expression of the array has to be provably an affine
expression of the length of the array.
A.3 Regions and Dynamic Memory
Allocation
The language provides three intrinsic functions (replacing malloc and free)
for region-based memory management: RInit, RFree, and RMalloc. The
region is made active by calling RInit() and freed (made inactive) using
RFree(). RMalloc has the same signature as malloc, and allocates mem-
ory within the active region.
The constraints imposed by Control-C to allow safe dynamic memory
allocation are summarized below.
(R1) Only one region is active at any point in the program. Thus calls
to RInit and RFree must alternate on every potential path in the
program, starting with an RInit.
(R2) The region should be active at any call to RMalloc.
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(R3) Because region memory must not be accessed after a region is freed,
any pointer value that contains a region address must be provably
dead (unused or unreachable) at a call to RFree. To verify this stati-
cally we have the following constraints
(a) Any local and global scalar pointer variable must be explicitly
reinitialized following a call to RFree, before any potential uses
of the variable. Note in particular that this includes variables
that never point to the heap (see the discussion below).
(b) Structures or arrays containing pointers must be allocated dy-
namically, either via RMalloc (on the heap) or via alloca (on
the stack). In particular, aggregate objects containing pointers
cannot live in global or local variables (with the exception of ini-
tialized constants).
Rules R3(a) and R3(b) can result in a severe run-time penalty since all
globals and local variables need to be reinitialized at every call to RFree,
irrespective of whether they point to region memory. In order to avoid this,
most compilers can analyze conservatively through an alias analysis if a
scalar pointer or a pointer in an aggregate typed variable hold an address
within the heap (region). Thus, we evolve the following modifications to
Rule R3, which may cause programs to be non-portable in the case that a
compiler on a different platform does not have the ability to perform this
alias analysis. However, we justify this non-portability by the potential
peformance enhancement, which is important for real-time control systems.
The weaker versions of R3(a) and R3(b) are the following:
(R3′(a)) Any local and global scalar pointer variable that may hold an address
within a heap region must be explicitly reinitialized following a call to
RFree, before any potential uses of the variable.
(R3′(b)) Pointer fields are permissible within global or local aggregate objects
only if they provably never hold an address within a heap region, and
their address is never taken. All other aggregate objects containing
pointer fields must be allocated dynamically, either via RMalloc) or
via alloca.
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Appendix B
Architecture for Tolerance
of Timing Delays
In chapter 1, we discussed architectures such as Simplex, which enable
system robustness in the presence of value errors, timing errors, and run-
time errors. In this chapter, we describe a robustness architecture, which
tolerates delays in networked control systems through a co-design architec-
ture. The architecture significantly extends deadlines for sensor feedback
and controller updates enabling controllers and actuators to operate reli-
ably even in the presence of delays due to communication or component
restarts. This enables controllers and actuators achieve local temporal au-
tonomy [46], which states that a component should be able to function au-
tonomously and reliably for a certain period of time in the presence of peer
component failures.
B.1 Problem
Networked control systems are conventionally designed with periodic com-
ponents with hard real-time guarantees. Sensors generate periodic up-
dates, controllers use these updates to compute periodic controls, actuators
implement these controls periodically, and most or all of these operations
are completed within hard deadlines. This mode of operation significantly
simplifies control design, and has consequently been enforced in most con-
trol systems. To enable this approach, systems engineers have relied on
effective scheduling algorithms based on conservative worst-case execution
deadlines, and communication channels such as CAN [37] and FDDI [2]
that provide real-time guarantees.
In such tightly coupled systems, missed deadlines in sensor updates or
controller computations usually result in the system transitioning to a fail-
safe state. This reduces system performance significantly, and hence the
system is usually over-engineered to ensure that deadlines are met. Conse-
quently, the correctness of system operation depends strongly on the peri-
odicity of sensor updates and controller computations.
With the widespread proliferation of best effort networks such as Ether-
net and 802.11 [76], control systems using such networks are being increas-
ingly deployed. However, such networks cannot provide real-time guaran-
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Figure B.1: Design enhancements in a typical control loop
tees, and wireless networks in particular have unpredictable delays and
high packet losses. This clearly violates the assumptions of digital control
design, and designing such systems using conventional techniques will re-
sult in the system frequently entering the fail-safe state.
Further, transient errors and residual software bugs in individual com-
ponents, particularly commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, often
result in component failures and software crashes. Such failures are usu-
ally handled by state check-pointing and component restarts. In fact, soft-
ware rejuvenation [95] is a well-documented fault management technique
where components are pro-actively restarted to avoid severe crash failures
in the future. In addition, planned software upgrade of components also
involves replacing an existing component. However, all these changes may
result in deadline violations necessitating fail-safe action. Hence, extension
of deadlines and graceful system degradation are imperative to improving
system performance during such changes.
B.2 Co-design Based Architecture
Networked control systems are characterized by components operating in
control loops. A typical control loop, shown in figure B.1(a), consists of
sensors, controllers, and actuators that control a physical plant. Sensors
monitor physical characteristics in the plant, and send periodic updates as
feedback to the controller. The controller uses this feedback, and computes
controls to achieve prescribed goals. These are then sent to actuators that
enforce the controls in the plant.
Digital control design assumes that all components in a control loop op-
erate periodically with hard real-time deadlines. For every period, the con-
troller receives feedback from the sensor and computes a set of controls that
are enforced by the actuator. The computation deadlines and communica-
tion delays have strict guarantees. In particular, violation of a controller
deadline would result in no control being sent to the actuator. This usually
results in a fail-safe operation being enforced by the actuator. Similarly, a
missed feedback deadline by the sensor would result in the controller miss-
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ing its deadline, and leads to fail-safe action as well.
In networked control systems, such deadline violations can occur due to:
(a) communication delays and data losses between the components, or (b)
failures and consequent restarts of the sensor or the controller. Commu-
nication delays on the link from the sensor to the controller can be partly
addressed by using a state estimator at the controller. However, deadline
misses due to delays on the link from the controller to the actuator, or com-
ponent failures, are harder to address. We do not consider actuator failures
since they are usually simple and robust components, and are separated
from the complex functionality of the controller for restart independence.
As noted above, controllers usually have a state estimator that main-
tains a model of the physical plant. This model captures the behavior of
the plant by representing its current configuration with a set of variables
called the state. The state in the model evolves according to the controls ap-
plied to the plant through the actuator. However, imprecise modeling and
imperfect calibration lead to an error between the states of the model and
the plant. This error is corrected by feedback from the sensors.
Our approach is based on two observations about this mechanism. First,
control systems usually have certain tolerances that allow the plant to be
operated within specified error bounds. For instance, a car in our testbed
can be off by a couple of inches without causing any collisions. Second,
the state estimator has a predictive capability, in that, its state can evolve
based only on the controls. Hence, as long as the error between the esti-
mated and actual states can be bounded, the plant can be guaranteed to
operate within the error bounds specified by system tolerance.
The above observations can be used to enhance the control loop as shown
in figure B.1(b). Specifically, we introduce the following enhancements:
I. The controller uses a state estimator to tolerate delays in sensor up-
dates.
II. The controller computes a sequence of future controls that are stored
in a control buffer at the actuator.
The first enhancement ensures that controllers have periodic estimates
of plant state from the state estimator. This allows controllers to be de-
signed using traditional digital control theory, and bridges the gap between
real-time control and best effort networks. For the second enhancement,
the controller computes a sequence of future controls, instead of just a sin-
gle control for the current period. To accomplish this, the estimator is used
as a state predictor to estimate the state of the plant as the sequence of
future controls is applied to it. These future controls are then stored in the
control buffer at the actuator, and are used in case the controller misses fu-
ture deadlines. Note that the second enhancement is what allows deadlines
to be extended in the sensor and the controller.
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The key idea in our approach is to reduce dependencies between com-
ponents that communicate over a network. However, the performance gain
is primarily determined by the horizon for which future controls are com-
puted, since the horizon determines extensions in deadlines. In particular,
the future control horizon depends on the following factors:
1. System tolerance and operational error bounds for the plant.
2. Growth of error in predictions by the state estimator.
3. Computational resources available to the controller to compute a se-
quence of future controls during each period.
4. Size of the control buffer at the actuator to store the future controls.
5. Communication bandwidth between the controller and the actuator to
send a sequence of future controls during each period.
The last three factors depend on system deployment constraints and can
be engineered as necessary. However, the growth of prediction error is de-
termined by the plant model, and the future control horizon is essentially
the interval up to which this error is within system tolerance. Thus, in sec-
tion B.4, we will only consider the the system tolerance and the prediction
error in order to estimate the deadline extension achieved by this technique
B.3 Application to Cars Testbed
The software architecture of the traffic control testbed shown in figure 1.2
is illustrated in figure B.2. There are two video processor components that
process video streams from corresponding cameras to determine car posi-
tions and orientations. This information is accumulated and merged in a
vision data server component, and is then available as feedback to other
components in the system. The controller and actuator components for
each car execute on the corresponding laptop as shown in the figure. All
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Figure B.3: Design enhancements in lower level control loop
other components execute on separate computers and communicate over a
network.
There are two control loops in the system as outlined in figure B.2. The
lower level loop involves the controller and actuator components that con-
trol corresponding cars. Each controller takes in a trajectory, which is a
timed sequence of track positions, and computes a sequence of controls to
operate the car along the given trajectory. The controls are sent to the ac-
tuator, which then transmits them to the car on the dedicated RF channel.
The higher level control loop involves the supervisor component, which
computes desired car trajectories and sends them to the controller. For in-
stance, in a traffic scenario the computed trajectories move the cars to their
destinations along a network of roads. If correctly followed, the trajectories
also ensure that cars do not collide, particularly at road intersections [43].
Hence, the main problem in the lower level control loop is to follow these
trajectories as closely as possible.
B.3.1 Design Enhancements
We have applied the ideas of section B.2 to enhance the software architec-
ture of the testbed and improve system robustness. In this work, however,
we only consider design enhancements for the lower level control loop in
figure B.2.
The key components and connections of the lower level control loop are
reproduced in figure B.3(a). As shown in the figure, the controller depends
on the vision data server, since the controller would have to operate with ob-
solete data if any updates are lost over the network. Similarly, the actuator
depends on the controller as it can only transmit the last received control
to the car. Consequently, this design is not robust, as updates from the vi-
sion data server and the controller have strict deadlines, and component
failures are hard to address.
These problems are similar to those illustrated in figure B.2, and the
same solutions apply as shown in figure B.3(b). The controller uses a state
estimator to get periodic estimates and tolerate delays in sensor updates.
The state estimator is also used as a predictor to compute a sequence of
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future controls that are stored in the control buffer at the actuator. In
particular, the extension of deadlines for updates from the sensor and the
controller is determined by the accuracy of state prediction. This issue is
analyzed in detail in the next section.
B.4 Analytical and Experimental Validation
We validate the above technique through theoretical analysis and verify
these analyses empircally [59]. While we present the validation of our ap-
proach for completeness, it is discussed in detail in Girish Baliga’s disser-
tation. We only summarize the results here. We address the following
questions:
1. What is the theoretical deadline extension achievable by this design?
2. Does the empirical growth in estimation error in the absence of feed-
back correspond to our theoretical extensions?
3. Is the testbed able to tolerate sensor and controller restarts (with
varying restart times) safely?
B.4.1 Analysis of State Prediction
The detailed analysis of the error growth in state prediction due to the state
estimator has been discussed in [59]. We modeled the error in the state of
the car as error in its position (x,y) and orientation(θ). The equation below
represents the transition equation which calculates the state of a car at
time t+ 1, given its state at time t.
xt+1 = Mtxt + wt (B.1)
where xt is the state of the car, Mt is the car model, and wt is the update
error, all at time t.
In the absence of feedback, the prediction error x˜t+1 grows with time,
giving us the following equation:
x˜t+1 ≤ wmaxt (B.2)
where wmaxt is the maximum prediction error in any step. Thus, in the
worst case the prediction error grows linearly with time with a constant
factor bounded by the maximum error in each time step..
However, in the mean error bound analysis, we have shown that the
mean prediction error grows as the square root of time given by:
ǫ =
√
E[x˜T
t+1x˜t+1] = k
√
t (B.3)
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for constant k. In practice, this equation gives a much longer deadline
extension compared to equation (B.2).
B.4.2 Experimental Results
As mentioned above, the experimental results are discussed in detail in
our paper [59] and in Girish Baliga’s dissertation. They are outlined here
for completeness. We implemented our architecture on Etherware [10, 11],
a message-oriented component middleware for networked control systems.
Etherware components interact using messages and have their own mes-
sage queues in which incoming messages are stored. Etherware provides
efficient restart mechanisms for components, by checkpointing component
state and re-initialization. For our experiments, sensors and controllers on
Etherware were restarted after varying intervals of time to study the effect
of delays on the behavior of the cars. The model used by each car controller
in the testbed implementation is a reasonable calibration of the discrete
speeds and steering angles of the car. This model functions as a state pre-
dictor. The actuator is implemented to contain a control buffer to hold the
sequence of speculative controls overwritten during each period, and used
in the event of delays.
Our experiment was that of two cars in a motorcade, with the follower
car closely following the leader car separated by 175mm ’bumper-to-bumper’
along an elliptical trajectory with major axis 2.8m and minor axis 2m. The
cars themselves are 225mm long and travel at an average speed of 371mm
per second. Each loop around the oval takes 21.7s to complete. Cars are
controlled autonomously. The safety constraint is that the maximum de-
viation of a leader car from its assigned trajectory should be 50mm. The
sensor and controller operate with 100ms periods.
We measured the growth of the state predictor error in the absence of
feedback by comparing the state to the actual state of the car. The error is
simply measured to be the distance (ignoring the orientation). Figure B.4
plots the error as a function of time elapsed since the last feedback was
received by the controller (dotted and dashed lines). The many such lines
represent the experiment repeated at different points in the trajectory. The
figure also shows the representative curve, approximately y = ksqrt(x),
where k is 1.0769, the function with the least mean squared error from the
prediction curves. This agrees with our average case analysis in equation
(B.3). Also, the maximum difference between calibrated speeds is 127mm/s.
Assuming this to be the worst case error in eq (B.2) the dashed line shows
the max error growth over a 2 second period from the time last feedback
was received. The average error and the maximum error provide us the ex-
tended average-case bound and the worst-case bound for the new real-time
deadline for the sensors and controllers due to our co-design architecture.
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Figure B.5: Distance between centers of cars in the motorcade
These are calculated by bounding the maximum deviation at 50mm, thus
giving us a 1300ms bound in the average case and a 400ms bound in the
worst case. This is a significant increase over the 100ms period of the sen-
sor and the controller, which permits communication delays and arbitrary
component restarts.
The second experiment consisted of sporadically restarting the controller
of the leader car with varying restart times, thus simulating restarts and
delays or a series of packet losses in the network. In rder to evaluate the
effectiveness of our mechanism, we disable the fail-safe in the system and
identify the delays for which the deviation of each car grows beyond 50ms.
We are primarily interested in the deviation of the leader car from its tra-
jectory. The minimum distance between the two cars (equal to the distance
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Figure B.6: Deviation of leader from its trajectory
between the centers of the two cars) is equal to the length of a car, 225mm.
The plot in figure B.5 demonstrates the physical manifestation of restarts
at different points on the trajectory and its temporal characteristics while
using our codesign architecture. The corresponding changes in the distance
between the cars is shown in figure B.6. The restart time in milliseconds
each case is shown in the graph. Inherent noise in the measurement, ac-
tuators, and trajectory computation causes the car to deviate by 25-35mm
even under normal operation.
In our architecture, we determined that 1300ms was the average case
upper bound for the future control horizon. We use a horizon of 1200ms for
our experiments. A ’STOP’ command is appended at the end of the horizon
of future controls. The initial deviation in the leader car until it catches
up is due the difference between the actual position of the leader car and
its assumed position in the trajectory. We begin restarting the leader car
controller after allowing the cars to stabilize over one elliptical loop (21.7s).
We observe that the deviation of the leader car exceeds the 50mm safety
bound only when restart time is greater than 1200ms. The restart time of
2044ms, results in the largest deviation for the leader car and the minimum
distance between the cars due to a collision. Restarts within 1200ms are
unnoticeable with perturbations within the maximum deviaition of 50mm.
Upon recovery, the leader car gains speed and catches up with its desired
trajectory and stabilizes the deviation.
B.5 Related Work
The problem of tolerating delays and errors in sensor feedback has been ad-
dressed from a control theoretic perspective in previous work. For instance,
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the effect of such delays on the operation and stability of a controller has
been studied in [70] and [96], and Nilsson [75] has analyzed the use of a
state estimator to stabilize controllers in the presence of random delays.
However, the focus of such research has been to improve the performance
of control algorithms in the presence of delays in sensor updates. In par-
ticular, software robustness issues based on real-time deadline extensions,
and tolerance to changes such as component restarts and upgrades have
not been addressed. There are many other robustness architectures, which
protect against value errors, software bugs including Simplex and other
works from section 1.6.1. Restarts of individual components for recovery,
pro-actively as well as reactively, have been described in software rejuve-
nation [95] and recovery-oriented computing [41, 14] techniques.
B.6 Chapter Summary
The key contributions in this chapter are summarized below:
1. We present a co-design based approach to improve robustness in net-
worked control systems. Our modular approach allows the control
engineer to use the traditional periodicity assumptions, and the sys-
tems engineer to build a system tolerant to communication delays and
component restarts.
2. We describe how our approach has been used to significantly improve
robustness in a traffic control testbed, a prototype networked control
system.
B.7 Future Work
We have established a co-design based architecture to enable local tempo-
ral autonomy for actuators and controllers in a networked control system.
In general, timing assumptions made by a component should be verified to
be satisfied along all the paths in the component. In particular, different
components in a controller, such as the control computation, the safety en-
velope calculation, etc. require feedback with precision and delay bounds.
The timing requirements of each of these functions should be satisfied along
all paths through the system. In the presence of the state estimator, the
ability of the estimator to tolerate delays in the peer component should be
specified.
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